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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of infertility among American couples desiring chil-
dren,' there has been a response from the medical and scientific com-
Copyright 1988, by LOUISTANA LAW REvIEw.
1. It is estimated that approximately 12% of married couples in the United States
are involuntarily childless. In about 40% of those cases the problem of infertility lies
with the woman. The most common cause is tubal disease resulting from infection,
endometriosis, or previous surgery. Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy.
L. Rev. 317 (1986). In addition, the availability of adoption as an alternative has decreased
markedly over the last fifteen years, largely as a result of the legalization of abortion
after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), and of increased societal tolerance
of single parenthood.
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munities to create solutions to the problem.2 The result has been astounding
growth in the development of new reproductive technologies that are
capable of extending to the infertile couple the hope of having a child
biologically related to at least one of the partners.3 The response from
the legislative and legal communities, however, has been neither im-
mediate nor effective. Artificial insemination,4 the most widely accepted
of these new technologies,' is now regulated in at least twenty-eight
states.6 In vitro fertilization 7 is regulated to some extent8 in many states. 9
Surrogate motherhood, the most recent and controversial of the new
technologies, is not regulated at all.10 As a result, parties who wish to
contract for the creation of children are left with no definitive answers
regarding their rights or status or those of the children they wish to
create.
2. These technologies include AIH (artificial insemination husband), in which the
wife is inseminated by depositing semen from her husband into the vagina by means of
a cannula or syringe; AID (artificial insemination donor), in which the semen is obtained
through a third party, usually an anonymous paid donor; IVF (in vitro fertilization), in
which an ovum and semen are combined in a glass dish in the laboratory, fertilization
occurs, the resulting product is incubated until it reaches the two-eight cell stage, and
finally the fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterus of the mother; and surrogate
motherhood, whereby a party or couple contracts with a third party woman to be artificially
inseminated, to carry a child to term, and to surrender it for adoption. Numerous variations
on these themes are possible.
3. Generally, when an infertile married couple uses one of these methods, the resulting
child will be biologically related to either the husband (surrogate motherhood using the
husband's semen), the mother (AID), or both (IVF, AIH). Embryo transfer, in which
the fertilized ovum is implanted in the body of a carrier, is a variation on surrogate
motherhood and IVF. The scope of this article will be confined to the more typical
surrogacy arrangement mentioned above.
4. AIH is used where the husband's sperm has decreased numbers or mobility. AID
is most frequently used by married couples when the husband is sterile or unable to
achieve intercourse. It has also been used by single women who wish to conceive. Comment,
Artificial Insemination: A New Frontier for Medical Malpractice and Medical Products
Liability, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 411, 413 (1986).
5. Artificial insemination has been used extensively in animals for centuries. The
first successful application to humans is credited to the English surgeon Hunter in 1790.
Id. at 411 n.5. The practice is generally accepted as an alternative means of conception.
6. Note, Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sensible Starting Point, 20 Ind. L.
Rev. 879, 883 n.27 (1987).
7. IVF is most frequently used by women with tubal disease, or older women, who
are more likely to have menstrual cycles in which they do not ovulate. It also is used
by some couples who are unable to achieve sexual intercourse and for certain types of
male infertility. Dickey, supra note 1, at 319.
8. In some states the practice of in vitro fertilization is regulated in its entirety,
including standards of care for the physician and facility. In others, it is regulated only
indirectly by statutes forbidding or controlling research on or disposition of human embryos
and fetuses. See La. R.S. 9:121-33 (Supp. 1988).
9. Id.
10. Note, supra note 6, at 879.
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As a first step in addressing this situation, the Louisiana legislature
in 1987 enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2713, making commercial
surrogate motherhood contracts absolutely null and unenforceable in
Louisiana. 1 A concurrent resolution was also passed, creating a legis-
lative study committee to consider the issues involved in this developing
area of the law and to recommend a future course of action for the
legislature.1 2
Before a reasoned and reasonable decision can be made regarding
legislation in the area of surrogacy contracts, there are numerous issues
that must be carefully considered. In this article, several of those issues
will be identified and analyzed. The purpose of this article is not to
provide all the answers, though a course of action will be proposed.
Indeed, some of the questions necessarily raised may not have answers.
Such is the scope and the nature of the problem.
The article begins with an overview of the legal issues implicated
by surrogate motherhood contracts and a brief statement of three possible
legislative courses of action. The following sections will contain discus-
sions of the judicial treatment of surrogacy, contractual issues, consti-
tutional issues, and conflicts between surrogacy and existing law and
social policy in Louisiana.
II. OVERVIEW
As a general proposition, it is pertinent to the analysis of any social
issue to know where we have been, where we are, and where we might
choose to go. Section III will look at where we have been, Sections
IV-VI will examine in detail the questions about where we are, and
11. La. R.S. 9:2713 (Supp. 1988) (enacted by 1987 La. Acts No. 583) provides:
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely
null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
o B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement whereby a
person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable consid-
eration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then to
relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and
obligations to the child.
While the scope of the statute is confined to commercial surrogate contracts, as defined
therein, the concerns discussed in this article are intended to apply to the practice of
surrogacy generally.
12. La. H.R. Con. Res. 2, Reg. Sess. 1987, HLS 87-590. The bill charges the committee
with conducting "a comprehensive review of all aspects concerning surrogate mothering"
and formulating "a policy to meet the needs of Louisiana citizens." The committee
members are to include three members of the House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure, three members of the Senate Committee on Judiciary A, one representative
from the Louisiana Medical Association, one from the Louisiana Bar Association, one
from the Louisiana Catholic Conference, and one from the Louisiana Interchurch Con-
ference.
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Section VII will offer recommendations about where we should go in
the law relating to surrogate motherhood as an alternative means of
conception. Before embarking on such a detailed undertaking, however,
a road map is in order.
A. Issues Implicated by Surrogate Motherhood Contracts
From its very inception, a typical contract to bear a child13 raises
substantial issues of contract law. Who may contract to obtain a child
in this manner? Who may not? Who may be a surrogate and who may
not? Serious questions arise regarding who are necessary parties to such
an arrangement and the capacity of those parties to bind themselves to
the obligations they are incurring. Assuming that those hurdles are
surmounted and a contract is formed, the nature of the obligations
involved creates a virtual maze of interlocking issues concerning en-
forceability.
The problems arising from accepted principles of contract law' 4 are
exacerbated by current interpretations of constitutional entitlement. Rea-
sonable contractual provisions necessary for the protection of the parties
and the clarification of their rights under the contract may be in direct
violation of substantive due process and privacy rights as those concepts
are presently understood.15
Another set of issues arises in the case of a breach of the surrogacy
contract. Again, one encounters conflicting constitutional protections,
some of which collide with accepted contractual principles. In addition,
the nature of the obligations involved and the "object" of the contract' 6
create unique difficulties regarding remedies, as well as enormous ques-
tions of social policy and ethics.
One of the most debated areas of the law as it pertains to alternative
means of reproduction is that of constitutional analysis. With cases
involving the right to marry, 7 to choose living arrangements," and to
13. For examples of surrogacy contracts, see In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d
1227 (1988); N. Keane & D. Breo, The Surrogate Mother, ch. 13 (1981).
14. This article will present contractual issues encountered primarily as they pertain
to the Louisiana Law of Obligations.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 165-79.
16. The "object" of these contracts is a child, with his or her own set of rights and
legal uncertainties. Though the object may be the child, this alone does not make surrogacy
contracts unlawful. It is, rather, how the nature of the contract is characterized that
affects that determination. For example, if characterized as a sale, the contract would be
unlawful by application of the criminal statutes forbidding the sale of minor children.
See generally, Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 Colum. J.L.
& Soc. Probs. 1, 11 (1986); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies
Under Legislative Proposals, 23 Washburn L.J. 601, 625 (1984).
17. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
18. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
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educate one's children,' 9 the United States Supreme Court began fash-
ioning an understanding of a fundamental right to make certain decisions
in private, unfettered by governmental intrusion or control. 20 This privacy
right was extended to procreational choices in the contraception 21 and
abortion 22 cases. The procreational choices at issue in those cases, how-
ever, involved decisions to prevent or avoid conception, gestation, and
childbearing. The most active debate as it relates to alternative pro-
creational technologies now centers on the question of whether the
Supreme Court intended to extend-or would so extend, given an ap-
propriate case-constitutional recognition to an affirmative right to pro-
create.23 This debate is complicated by suggestions that Roe v. Wade,
the fountainhead decision that greatly liberalized the right to privacy in
matters of reproductive choice, may soon be overturned.24 The impact
upon the law of such a turn of events is uncertain, but probably would
be substantial.
A thorough examination of the issues relevant to any area of con-
templated legislation necessarily must include consideration of how cur-
rent law impacts directly or indirectly upon the subject in question. The
inquiry must not end, however, with the identification of existing laws
19. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
20. "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Such a privacy right has been grounded variously in the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and in "penumbral" rights
emanating from the enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See generally P. Kauper
& F. Beytagh, Constitutional Law 1562 (5th ed. 1980).
21. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 1766
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 165-70.
22. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405 (1983) (proposing such constitutional protection
does or will exist) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]. Cf. O'Brien, Commercial
Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 127, 139 (1986) (arguing
that such protection would be an unwarranted extension of the right to privacy). See
infra text beginning note 180.
24. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103
S. Ct. 2481 (1983), Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented.
This dissent has been characterized as a "new willingness on the part of the more
conservative justices to readdress the privacy issues presented in Roe and its progeny."
Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 Geo. L.J. 1283, 1297 n.112 (1985). The addition of Justices Scalia
and Kennedy may further effect a change in the analysis of privacy rights.
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that may dictate or conflict with a possible course of action. Law is
not created in a vacuum; rather, it reflects considerations of custom,
social policy and ethics. These underlying policies must be the real focus
of inquiry if the result reached is to be palatable to the social conscience.
Given the nature of the practices involved in surrogate motherhood
contracts, several different Louisiana statutes, each concerned with a
distinctive area of the law, might be drawn upon by courts in an effort
to resolve the issues raised by such contracts. Statutes governing obli-
gations in general, the marital relationship, 25 adoption,26 and the sale
of minor children 27 are implicated, at the least. An examination of the
policies underlying existing laws, as well as other questions of social
policy and ethics, must be carefully and thoughtfully pursued.
B. Potential Legislative Courses of Action
Surrogate motherhood contracts are currently unenforceable in Louis-
iana. 28 They are not, however, proscribed by law as no criminal sanctions
are imposed on the participants. The result is that the current state of
the law does not sufficiently dissuade parties from entering into such
arrangements. 29 Their rights and status, and those of the child they
create, are such as they would be in the absence of any contract. The
outcome of any possible litigation pursuant to such an agreement is,
therefore, highly speculative.
The legislature bears the responsibility for laying a foundation for
the courts in deciding the rights of parties involved in a dispute. There
are three possible courses of action the legislature might choose to pursue.
It may:
1. Do nothing, an action that would leave the contracts unen-
forceable, but not illegal.
2. Make these contracts legal and enforceable.
3. Make these contracts illegal.
The first course of action may be the most attractive politically,30
but it is certainly the least acceptable. This choice would leave prospective
25. La. Civ. Code art. 98. See infra note 273.
26. La. R.S. 9:401-62 (1965 & Supp. 1988). See infra note 258.
27. La. R.S. 14:286 (1986 & Supp. 1988). See infra note 267.
28. La. R.S. 9:2713 (Supp. 1988).
29. The desire to obtain a child is a very strong motivating factor, as can be seen
by the fact that parties continue to search for babies through clearly illegal channels, as
in black market adoptions. The author does not suggest seeking to counter this motivation
by the threat of criminal sanctions on prospective parents, but rather by seeking to remove
the market through strong enforcement against the intermediaries. See infra text accom-
panying notes 299-302.
30. The issues raised by surrogate motherhood, as with other reproductive technologies,
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parties to such a contract in exactly the legal quagmire that persons on
both sides of the issues are trying to eliminate. The most important
"party," the child, is the ultimate casualty in such a scenario. His
legitimacy, inheritance rights, custody, and perhaps his very life are left
open to the caprices of the parties and of an unguided judiciary. In
addition, the current legislation in force is not without ambiguities and
potential difficulties."
The second course of action-making these contracts legal and en-
forceable-is that most frequently espoused by proponents of surrogate
motherhood.3 2 It is, however, only a preliminary step. The necessary
and logical extension of this alternative is regulation of the practice.
Exactly how and to what extent surrogate motherhood contracts should
be regulated are questions which have been the subject of copious
quantities of legal writings and debates.33 Basically, regulatory schemes
frequently arouse emotional and heated responses. The political touchiness of the subject
is also readily apparent from the fact that, while legislation has been proposed in at least
twenty-four states to date, at the time this article was prepared for publication no legislative
body has yet taken a definitive stand on the subject. Special Project: Legal Rights and
Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 597, 664 n.342
(1986). Additionally, by leaving the practice untouched by legislative hands, the nagging
constitutional issues are avoided.
31. Paragraph (B) of La. R.S. 9:2713 (Supp. 1988) provides that a surrogacy contract
is "any agreement whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees
for valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and
then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations
to the child." The provision apparently does not cover a gratuitous surrogacy contract
(where no "valuable consideration" is paid). If such a surrogate changed her mind and
wanted to retain custody, would the father be able to enforce the contract? Or would
her change of heart perhaps constitute a "failure of cause"? It is not clear on what
policies the legislature was basing its prohibition. Yet another problem arises in the case
where the sperm is provided by a third party donor for the contracting couple. Relin-
quishment would then not be to the "contributor of the sperm." Would this contract be
outside the purview of the statute?
32. See generally Robertson, supra note 23. Cf. Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the
Baby M. Decision, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 19 (1988) (purportedly pro-surrogacy contracts
oriented but espousing complete freedom of choice for all parties at all stages of the
surrogacy relationship, an approach which would leave the contracts unenforceable and
therefore far less attractive); Garrison, Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures
Do?, 22 Fam. L.Q. 149, 160 (1988) (saying it is not practical to prohibit surrogacy, but
that all "bright-line" approaches to regulation are untenable; suggesting, in the alternative,
that legislatures "should focus on achieving compatibility with the family law principles
governing parental agreements and custody/visitation rights and with the basic policy goals
of the adoption statutes" by simply clarifying existing law and its applicability in the
surrogacy context).
33. A detailed discussion of specific proposed legislation and model acts is beyond
the scope of this article. For an excellent discussion of the proposed legislation in various
states, see Note, supra note 6. See also Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the
New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50 (Aug. 1984); Katz, supra note 16. Two
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proposed thus far3 4 have taken a "streamlined," "detailed," or "mod-
erate" approach." The streamlined approach represents a minimalist
attempt to regulate the interests of the parties. It goes little beyond the
preliminary determination that surrogacy contracts should be legal and
enforceable, and leaves many of the basic issues unresolved.3 6 The de-
tailed approach contains many of the same procedural requirements as
are found in adoption proceedings, including psychological evaluations
of the parties. Additional counseling requirements and fee controls are
also included.3 7 The chief criticism of this approach has been that it
should not so closely parallel adoption 3S-a criticism that is largely
unfounded, given that the ultimate act in a surrogacy arrangement is
in fact the adoption of the child. The moderate approach calls for
required contractual provisions lying between those of the other two
approaches in scope, and allows parties to specify additional provisions
as they desire.3 9 These proposals too, however, leave some basic issues
extremely thorough model surrogacy acts have taken very divergent paths. See Model
Human Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72 Iowa L.Rev. 943 (1987); Draft
ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 Fam. L.Q. 123 (1988). The Iowa model act called for
mental and physical evaluations of all parties (surrogate and biological father and their
spouses), required judicial pre-authorization of the contract, restricted the practice to cases
where the intended (adopting) mother was medically unable to have a child, and allowed
revocation of surrender by the surrogate within 72 hours after the birth. There were
provisions for damages and specific performance was not permitted. By contrast, the ABA
Model Act provided for evaluations of all parties, but provided for irrevocable consent
and mandated specific performance after the birth of the child. While both sought to
ensure availability and regulation of the practice, that published by the Iowa Law Review
evidenced a stronger concern for the resulting children, while the ABA Model Act showed
stronger regard for protecting the rights of the intended parents (the biological father and
his wife).
34. For examples of legislation on the subject, see Ala. H.R. 593 (1982); Alaska
H.R. 497 (1981); Alaska H.R. 498 (1981); Cal. Ass. Bill 3771 (April 6, 1982; amended
May 18, 1982; amended June 17, 1982; amended Aug. 2, 1982); Conn. Comm. Bill 5316
(1983); Haw. H.R. 1009 (1983); Kan. S. 361 (1983); Kan. S. 485 (1984); Ky. H.R. 668
(1986); Md. H.R. 1552 (1985); Md. H.R. 1595 (1984); Mich. H.R. 4555 (1985); Minn.
H.R. 534 (1983); Or. H.R. 2693 (1983); S.C. H.R. 3491 (1982). Note, supra note 6, at
891 n.60.
35. This classification scheme is adopted from Katz, supra note 16, at 44-48.
36. Examples of this approach are the bills introduced in Alaska and Rhode Island.
Only basic provisions are required regarding compensation, presumption of paternity, and
termination of parental rights. Alaska H.R. 498, 12th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981); R.I. Assembly
83-H 6132, Jan. Sess. (1983). Katz, supra note 16, at 44.
37. Examples of states that follow this approach include California, Connecticut,
Hawaii, New Jersey, and South Carolina. Cal. Bill Ass. 3771, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1982);
Conn. Ass. 5316, Jan. Sess. (1983); Haw. H.R. 1009, 12th Leg. (1983); N.J. S. 3608
(1983); S.C. H.R. 2098 (1982). Katz, supra note 16, at 45.
38. Katz, supra note 16, at 48.
39. Examples of this approach are, inter alia, the Kansas, Michigan, and New York
proposals. Kan. S. 485, 1984 Sess. (1984); Mich. H.R. 4114 (substitute H-3) (1983); N.Y.
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unresolved. Both the detailed and moderate proposals contain provisions
that may run afoul of constitutional guarantees. 40
Finally, surrogacy contracts may be made illegal as well as unen-
forceable. While this approach may seem harsh, it is grounded in a
need to protect the parties, and is really the only feasible alternative to
legal, regulated contracts."' No jurisdiction yet has chosen such an
alternative, although this solution has been proposed in some states. 4
2
In England, commercial surrogacy agreements expose the parties to
criminal penalties.4 3 As will be shown below, this course of action is
the one best supported by public and ethical considerations, and is the
only meaningful response to the overwhelming assortment of issues raised
by these contracts. 44
III. MODERN JuDiciAL TREATMENT OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
Perhaps the most uniform response to surrogacy contracts has come
from several state Attorneys General. Opinions in at least four states
have expressed the view that surrogate motherhood contracts are in
violation of existing law and contrary to public policy.45
By contrast, in the few instances in which surrogate motherhood
contracts have come before the courts, the results have been less than
consistent. The opinions generated by these cases have done relatively
little to clarify the legal status of the practice. The cases usually have
been decided on very narrow technical grounds, avoiding whenever pos-
sible the central issue of the legality of surrogacy itself.
In Doe v. Kelley," a married couple brought suit against the Mi-
chigan Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the state statutes
Ass. 5537, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1983); N.Y. Ass. 6624, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1983). Katz,
supra note 16, at 48.
40. Specifically, provisions which waive the surrogate's exclusive right to abortion
and require consent of the surrogate's husband may be in conflict with Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), respectively. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
41. As stated previously, alternative one is completely unacceptable, as it leaves parties
undissuaded, unguided and unprotected. Illegality of the contracts, however, is a means
of dissuading parties from entering into an unenforceable contract with very serious and
permanent implications.
42. See Note, supra note 16, at 619 n.106.
43. Freeman, England: The Trumping of Parental Rights, 25 J. Fam. L. 91, 101
(1986-87) (discussing the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985).
44. At this juncture, the author adopts the following disclaimer: "The objective of
this Article is neither to depreciate the suffering of individual infertile couples nor to
portray them as the unscrupulous predators of indigent surrogates." O'Brien, supra note
23, at 129 n.14.
45. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-18 (1981); Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 83-869 (Oct. 18,
1983); Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. No. 83-001 (1983); Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 83-162 (1983).
46. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
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that prohibited payment in conjunction with adoption unconstitutionally
infringed upon their fundamental right to procreate. The Does (a pseu-
donym) wished to contract with Mary Roe (also a pseudonym), John
Doe's secretary, to be artificially inseminated with John Doe's semen,
to carry the resulting child to term, and to relinquish it to them for
adoption. Ms. Roe was to be paid the fee of $5,000 in addition to all
medical expenses .47
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed judgment against the Does.
In so doing, the court recognized an affirmative right to procreate, but
concluded that it did not serve as a bar to the application of the
particular state statute at issue. The statute, as characterized by the
court, did not directly prohibit the Does from having a child through
a surrogacy arrangement, but simply precluded their payment of con-
sideration in conjunction with their use of the state's adoption proce-
dures. 4 The court held that "[w]hile the decision to bear or beget a
child has thus been found to be a fundamental interest protected by
the right of privacy, we do not view this right as a valid prohibition
to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual arrangement. ' 49
This opinion has been criticized as implying that "babyselling"
statutes apply to a commercial surrogacy contract only if the sponsoring
couple attempts to adopt the child.5 0 Under this standard, if the couple
simply took custody of the child without changing its legal parentage,
the contract would arguably be lawful. However, such an alternative
would leave the legitimacy and inheritance rights of the child open to
serious question." This criticism overlooks the fact that the Kelley court
did not pass on any issues other than the narrow one before it. The
court merely recognized a fundamental procreational right that did not
preclude application of the state statute, without defining the limits of
the right. Interpreted strictly and properly, Kelley simply does not stand
for the proposition that a surrogacy contract is otherwise lawful under
Michigan law as long as it does not violate that state's babyselling
statute.
The Kelley court may also be criticized for leaping blithely over
some difficult constitutional analysis in reaching its conclusion that the
47. Id. at 172, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
48. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
49. Id. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
50. This criticism was advanced by Noel Keane, the Michigan attorney who has been
at the forefront of surrogate motherhood practice in the United States. N. Keane & D.
Breo, supra note 13, at 116-17. Mr. Keane was the attorney of record for the Does, as
well as for the plaintiffs in Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211
(1985). See infra text accompanying note 53.
51. Note, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate
Mother Arrangements, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 415, 424 (1987).
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existence of an affirmative right to procreate is a settled question. It is
true that the holding of the case did not depend on this analysis, since
the statute, as interpreted, did not conflict with the right recognized.
However, the status of such a, right is the central constitutional issue
in the field of reproductive technology, and a more careful consideration
was merited.5 2
Syrkowski v. Appleyard5 is considered by some to be a small victory
for the advocates of surrogate motherhood. In actuality, it was merely
an exercise in applying the clear language of a statute. The Syrkowskis
were an infertile couple who entered into a surrogate motherhood con-
tract with Corinne Appleyard, a married woman. Five months before
the birth of the child, Mr. Syrkowski instituted proceedings under Mi-
chigan's Paternity Act seeking an order of filiation naming him as the
father of the child. Mrs. Appleyard, as a nonadversarial defendant,
admitted Mr. Syrkowski's paternity and joined in his request. The At-
torney General intervened, seeking accelerated judgment on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. He maintained that
the Paternity Act was intended to apply only to a child born "out of
wedlock" and that this child was presumed to be the legitimate child
of Mrs. Appleyard and her husband.5 4
The circuit court granted the motion for accelerated judgment, and
the court of appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed,
because the Attorney General and the lower courts had not applied the
criteria supplied by the statute for the use of the presumption of pa-
ternity.5 The husband of the mother must have consented to her artificial
insemination in order for the presumption of his paternity to apply. In
this case, Mr. Appleyard had filed with the court an affidavit of non-
consent at the time the Attorney General intervened.5 6
Syrkowski should not be viewed as an extension of the paternity
laws to accommodate surrogacy contracts. The Michigan Supreme Court
had little choice but to apply the statute as written. The trial judge
looked beyond the language of the Paternity Act to the 1956 legislative
history to find, not surprisingly, that the legislature had not intended
to include surrogate motherhood contracts within the purview of the
statute. The judge did not wish to go beyond the stated purpose of the
52. The court merely cited Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.
Ct. 2010 (1977) as dispositive of the issue, footnoting a list of U.S. Supreme Court cases
dealing with the right to privacy. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. at 172-73, 307 N.W.2d at 440-
41.
53. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
54. Id. at 370-71, 362 N.W.2d at 212.
55. Id. at 372, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
56. Id. at 369. 362 N.W.2d at 212.
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Act of "securing financial support for children born out of wedlock, ' 5 7
because he did not wish to sanction surrogacy contracts, which he
considered to be against public policy. The court of appeals affirmed
this reasoning, saying the Act's "original purpose 'does not encompass
the monetary transaction proposed in this case.' "58 By overlooking the
clear language of the Act, the lower courts exceeded their authority in
looking to the legislative history.
The case does, however, point out some of the legal contortions in
which parties are indulging-and which courts are allowing-in order
to fit their surrogacy contracts within the parameters of existing law.
The affidavit of nonconsent employed successfully by the surrogate's
husband in Syrkowski is a device frequently resorted to by parties to
these contracts.5 9
Another bit of legal subterfuge has been required for parties to
avoid the criminal liability associated with babyselling laws. In Surrogate
Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 60 the Attorney
General of Kentucky brought suit against the plaintiff corporation, seek-
ing to revoke its corporate charter on the ground that it had misused
its corporate powers in a way detrimental to the state and its citizens. 61
Specifically, the Attorney General alleged that Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates, Inc. (SPA), by its involvement in and solicitation of surrogacy
contracts, violated the Kentucky statute prohibiting the purchase of a
child. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the corporation;
on appeal by the Attorney General, the court of appeals reversed. The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed reinstating the trial court's judgment,
though the court was divided on the issue.6 2
The SPA agreements that were signed by the parties specifically
excluded the biological father's wife, the party who ultimately must
adopt the child. This provided enough of a foundation for the supreme
court to find that the contract did not involve the payment of consid-
eration for an adoption in violation of the state law. In so doing, the
court closed its eyes to the fact that the policy behind such statutes is
the prohibition against payment for termination of parental rights; rather,
the court placed its emphasis on the fact that the biological father, as
the party to the contract, could not pay to adopt his own child. 63 The
57. Id. at 372, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
58. Id. at 373, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
59. The husband in Syrkowski, and in In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 345,
525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (Ch. Div. 1987) signed affidavits that they, in effect, "agreed not
to agree" to the procedure, in order to circumvent the presumption of paternity.
60. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
61. Id.
62. Three justices concurred with the majority, one concurred in the result but not
the reasoning, and there were two cogent dissents. Id. at 214.
63. Id. at 212.
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court of appeals, on the other hand, accurately assessed the realities of
the situation, stating: "[tihe infertile wife of the biological father is the
sine qua non of this procedure." "Artful draftsmanship," the court
further noted, that was "designed to nominally include only the biological
father, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband so as to avoid the
purview of [the babyselling statute] must fail." 64
The most notorious surrogate motherhood case to date is that of
In re Baby M.,65 which is also the most recent judicial pronouncement
on the subject.6 6 Drs. William and Elizabeth Stern entered into a sur-
rogate mother contract with Mary Beth Whitehead and her husband
Richard. 67 Mrs. Stern was not infertile, but suffered from a mild form
of multiple sclerosis, which she was advised could be exacerbated to
the point of becoming debilitating if she undertook a pregnancy. 6 Mrs.
Whitehead was inseminated with Mr. Stern's semen and became preg-
nant. The Sterns and the Whiteheads maintained contact throughout the
pregnancy.69
Late in the pregnancy, Mrs. Whitehead exhibited the first signs of
ambivalence toward fulfilling her obligations under the contract when
she delayed signing papers acknowledging Mr. Stern's paternity.70 Upon
the child's birth, this ambivalence became a determination not to relin-
quish the child born to her. Mrs. Whitehead informed the Stems when
they came to the hospital immediately after the birth that she "was not
sure whether she could relinquish" the child. 71 This was the beginning
of an ordeal for all the parties concerned that lasted for several months.
Mrs. Whitehead took the infant home from the hospital, after
naming her husband as the father on the birth certificate, a breach of
the surrogacy contract. 72 She had further breached the agreement by
supplying a name for the child, a privilege reserved to Mr. Stern. 73 The
Sterns picked up the baby from the Whiteheads' residence. However,
64. Id. at 211.
65. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987).
66. The case was argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court in September, 1987.
A decision was rendered Feb. 3, 1988 and is reported in 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988).
67. 217 N.J. Super. at 345, 525 A.2d at 1143. Elizabeth Stern was not a signatory
to the contract, and Richard Whitehead signed an acknowledgement that he refused to
consent to the artificial insemination of his wife. Id. These provisions were designed to
avoid the legal conflicts with baby-selling and presumptions of paternity which were
previously discussed. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. 525 A.2d at 1139.
69. Id. at 1143.
70. Id. at 1144.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1143.
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the next day, Mrs. Whitehead telephoned, visited the child at the Sterns,
and stated that she had been considering suicide if she had to give up
the baby. Out of concern for Mrs. Whitehead's emotional health, the
Sterns agreed to one week's custody of the child by the Whiteheads.14
Mrs. Whitehead took the child to Florida from New Jersey without
the Sterns' knowledge. When she returned, slightly more than a week
later, she informed the Stems of her decision to keep the child." She
threatened to leave the country if confronted with court action. Some
three weeks later, the Sterns obtained a court order directing Mrs.
Whitehead to deliver custody of the infant to them. When the Sterns
and the authorities came to serve the order, Mrs. Whitehead passed the
infant out of a rear bedroom window to her husband. The following
morning, the entire Whitehead family disappeared. 76
What followed was three months of nomadic existence in Florida
with the baby. The Sterns did not discover the whereabouts of the
Whitehead family for 87 days. Ultimately, Florida authorities recovered
the child from the home of Mrs. Whitehead's parents, and custody was
transferred to the Sterns. All the parties returned to New Jersey, where
pending litigation by the Sterns was pursued. 77
The New Jersey Superior Court awarded custody of the baby to
the Sterns and terminated all parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead. 78 The
lengthy opinion was somewhat schizophrenic in its reasoning. The court
framed the issue before it in terms of of what constituted "the best
interests of a child" and stated that its consideration of all other issues
constituted mere "commentary. 7 9 However, this "commentary" actually
constituted the essential legal reasoning of the decision and included
findings on the constitutionality and enforceability of the contract.
The trial court found a constitutionally protected right to procreate
that includes the use of surrogates,80 but held that a contractual provision
granting the right of control over abortion to the contracting father was
unconstitutional. 8' The court's position on the enforceability of other
aspects of surrogacy contracts is less clear.
The ultimate basis for the enforcement of the Stern-Whitehead con-
tract by the Superior Court was that, in the court's view, the best
interests of the child so demanded.12 It appears from the many pages
74. Id. at 1144.
75. Id. at 1145.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1146.
78. Id. at 1175.
79. Id. at 1132.
80. Id. at 1164.
81. Id. at 1159.
82. Id. at 1170.
[Vol. 49
COMMENTS
of the opinion devoted to expert testimony on the psychological eval-
uations of the parties that the court was, more accurately, finding that
the child's best interests dictated a particular custody placement. The
opinion even stated that "Melissa's best interests will be served by being
placed in her father's sole custody." 3 The court ordered that the sur-
rogacy contract be specifically enforced, but couched its reasoning in
terms of the traditional standard for resolution of a custody dispute,
"the best interests of the child." It is therefore not clear exactly what
precedent the court was setting-one favoring enforcement of these
contracts or one favoring abandoning the contract and treating the matter
as a custody dispute between two biological parents. The ultimate stan-
dard employed by the court is, however, clearly that what is ultimately
best for the child should be determinative.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court14 also characterized the
central issue as the custody of the child, but recognized that the lower
court had muddied the waters on the contractual validity issue. In a
very carefully reasoned opinion, the high court declared the contract
void as violative of New Jersey law and public policy and affirmed the
custody award to Mr. Stern, but voided Mrs. Stern's adoption and
restored Mrs. Whitehead's maternal rights. The court found that the
contract violated provisions of law forbidding payment for termination
of parental rights and allowing revocation of consent to terminate pa-
rental rights.
Turning to considerations of policy, the court found that surrogacy
contracts violate the public policy that natural parents have equal rights
relative to their child. The parent-child link may be broken only upon
voluntary abandonment of a child after its birth or a strong showing
of neglect or unfitness as a parent. The court found that "[t]he Leg-
islature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially
restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow
termination to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract.' '85 While
the best interest of the child is dispositive of the issue of custody, the
court held that it is not the sole determinative standard in termination
of parental rights, and that the strong traditional, moral, and possibly
constitutional interests of the parents must also be considered.
The court also made it clear that the payment to the surrogate
violated the principles behind babyselling laws, pointing out that no
payment was to be made if the pregnancy terminated before the fourth
month, and that only 10 percent would be paid if the child was not
born alive even at term. Any contention that surrogacy fees are paid
83. Id.
84. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
85. Id. at 1243-44.
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for "services" would therefore be unpersuasive s6 Recognizing the reality
of economic coercion that it felt was common to babyselling and sur-
rogacy, contrary to many proponents commentaries, the court stated
that "one should not pretend that disparate wealth does not play a
part.'8 7
The opinion expressed strong concern over the fact that a woman
can not make an "informed" decision to terminate her right to a child
before it is even conceived, for she cannot possibly at that time know
the strength of the bond she may feel toward that child. The court saw
surrogacy contracts as "potentially degrading to women." Though there
may be surrogates who would feel fulfilled by their surrogacy and would
complete their obligations under the contract, the court stated that their
interests in participating in such an arrangement could not negate the
"potential for devastation" to other women."8
Regarding constitutional issues, the court found that the right of
procreation claimed by the Sterns did not extend so far as to protect
their rights under a surrogacy contract. Procreation does not include
the care, custody, and companionship of the child created, and therefore
the existence of a right of procreation cannot compel a custody deter-
mination s9
The court gave great consideration to the opinions of the guardian
ad litem appointed to represent Baby M.'s interests at the outset of
litigation. The guardian ad litem had recommended awarding custody
to the Sterns, but suggested that retention of the biological mother's
parental rights would also be in the best interests of the baby. The
guardian recommended, however, that visitation be postponed until some
future date after the child had had an opportunity to establish a stable
life. The high court remanded to the trial court for a determination of
this issue, as visitation had not been considered there due to the dis-
position of the termination issue.
It may be seen, then, that courts have been far from uniform in
their resolution of surrogacy disputes and in their interpretations of
existing law as it should apply to those disputes. Seeking to fit surrogacy
within the framework of existing law does not, therefore, appear to be
a realistic approach, especially when clarification of that framework is
left to the courts.9 It is for this reason that legislative action is necessary.
86. Id. at 1241.
87. Id. at 1249.
88. Id. at 1250.
89. Id. at 1254.
90. Contra Garrison, Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?, 22 Fain.
L.Q. 149, 160 (1988).
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IV. CONTRACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a surrogate moth-
erhood contract is not contrary to existing law or social policy, the
agreement by its very nature raises questions of contract law that are
very difficult to resolve. Those questions include who are the necessary
parties to the contract, what are their respective rights and remedies,
and how the contract may be enforced.
A. Parties and Capacity
Who may be a party to a surrogacy contract? Who must be?
Typically, the parties to a surrogate motherhood contract are the sur-
rogate, her husband if she is married, and the biological (sponsoring)
father. 9' Under some legislative proposals, the wife of the biological
father, if he is married, must also be a party.92
Requiring the husband of the surrogate to be a signatory may present
practical and even constitutional problems. It may be an unconstitutional
infringement on the surrogate's privacy rights, in violation of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,93
which held that consent for abortion may not be required from a
pregnant woman's spouse or parent. Similarly, if an affirmative right
to procreate were recognized, and included surrogacy, a woman pre-
sumably would be free to exercise it without her husband's consent. In
some states the husband's consent is also the triggering element for the
application of the presumption of his paternity, though in Louisiana his
paternity is presumed solely due to his status as husband, and his consent
to his wife's artificial insemination merely terminates his right to timely
disavow the child. 94 However, excluding him or obtaining his affidavit
of nonconsent is frequently mere artifice employed in an attempt to
avoid the presumption.95 Such a device would be ineffective in Louisiana
except to preserve a right to disavow, and prudent counsel would prob-
ably go so far as to require the husband to execute a promise to disavow
paternity. This raises the same policy issues as are implicated by the
mother's pre-birth irrevocable consent to relinquish the child. Addition-
91. For examples of fairly typical contracts, see N. Keane & D. Breo, supra note
13, at 275-306; Special Project, supra note 30, at 635 n.181.
92. See S.C. H.R. 3491 (1982). The Iowa Model Act, supra note 33, also requires
the spouses of both genetic parents to sign as parties to the contract.
93. 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
94. La. Civ. Code art. 188. It is noteworthy that at least one Louisiana court has
held the legal (presumed) father to be an indispensable party to an avowal action by the
biological father. See Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). This would
indicate the advisability of making the surrogates husband a party to the contract.
95. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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ally, the surrogate typically obligates herself to abstain from sexual
relations with her husband during the period of time from first insem-
ination with the sponsoring father's semen until pregnancy occurs. 96 This
in effect binds her husband to a waiver of his marital rights, 97 and
fairness would dictate that his consent be required, 9 if indeed the parties
can legally alter or abrogate these rights. 99
Restricting the availability of surrogacy to certain groups or classes
of potential parties has certain advantages, but may raise constitutional
challenges. For instance, some deem it desirable that only infertile mar-
ried couples be permitted to contract with a surrogate to obtain a child.' °°
This, however, would invite allegations of denial of equal protection
based upon classifications of sexual preference or marital status.101 The
same problem also arises with requirements that the surrogate be a
married woman. Some surrogacy proponents suggest that the surrogate
should be unmarried, in order to avoid problems with the presumption
of paternity.10 2 However, a married surrogate or one who has successfully
delivered at least one child has the attractive quality of a proven track
record. 103
96. Some surrogacy contracts are by their provisions voidable if pregnancy does not
occur within a specified length of time, usually 90-180 days. See supra note 91.
97. La. Civ. Code art. 98. See infra notes 272-77 and accompanying text.
98. In actuality, the husband is not legally bound by a contract to which he is not
a party. If he therefore chooses to exercise his marital rights, the question for the surrogate
becomes which contract is superior-her marriage contract or the surrogacy contract. If
her husband does consent and/or is a party to the contract, it brings one back full circle
to the presumption that the child born is the legitimate issue of the surrogate and her
husband.
99. See Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
100. Other possibilities include infertile unmarried cohabitants, homosexual individuals
or couples, single persons, and women who are fertile but wish to forego pregnancy for
reasons of convenience, career, or aesthetics. See generally L. Andrews, The Stork Market,
supra note 33, at 53; L. Andrews, New Conceptions 198 (1984); Graham, Surrogate
Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 Santa Clara L. Rev. 291, 304 (1982).
Of proposed regulations in 11 states, 7 require a married biological father, 2 of those
7 require the couple to be infertile, and 4 allow an unmarried biological father. Note,
Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sensible Starting Point, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 879, 892
(1987).
101. See infra notes 217-43 and accompanying text.
102. Noel Keane prefers unmarried surrogates for this reason. N. Keane & D. Breo,
supra note 13, at 49.
103. Co-founders Dr. Richard Levin and Katie Brophy of Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates, Inc. in Kentucky prefer married surrogates. Regardless of her marital status, she
must have delivered at least one live, healthy child. N. Keane & D. Breo, supra note 13,
at 219; Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 465, 476 n.47 (1983).
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B. Enforceability and Remedies
In general, individuals are free to contract, and their agreements
will have the force of law as between the parties. 104 This freedom is,
however, subject to certain limitations. If the object or the cause of
the obligation incurred by a party is unlawful, the contract is unen-
forceable. 03 Cause is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation
would produce a result that is prohibited by law or against public
policy. 106
Even absent the express statutory prohibition on surrogacy con-
tracts,10 7 surrogate motherhood contracts are potentially unenforceable
if any portion thereof is in conflict with existing law or is deemed to
be against public policy. Performance or enforcement of a surrogacy
contract may require acts that are in conflict with several provisions of
existing Louisiana law, including provisions regarding adoption and the
sale of minor children. 08 Legislation permitting and regulating surrogacy
contracts certainly could make such prohibitory laws inapplicable, but
existing law represents policy choices that perhaps should not be dis-
carded lightly.
Assuming that these contracts are legally enforceable, the practical
enforceability of the agreements would still be open to serious question.
As is true of any contract, questions of its enforceability only arise in
the face of a breach by one or more of the parties. The nature of the
surrogate motherhood contract and the types of breach to which it may
fall prey present unique problems.
Unlike at common law, the preferred remedy in civilian theory for
the breach of an obligation is specific performance.' °9 In both systems,
however, a respect for personal autonomy dictates that contracts for
personal services will not, as a rule, be specifically enforced." 0 Whether
one characterizes a surrogacy contract as one for services (a contract
to do) or one for the conveyance of a child (a contract to give), there
is little doubt that the performance involved is a highly personal one.
For that reason, such contracts are probably not susceptible to specific
performance. Faced with the occurrence of a breach, the chief concern
104. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
105. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966 (an obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause),
1971 (parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful).
106. La. Civ. Code art. 1968.
107. La. R.S. 9:2713 (Supp. 1988).
108. La. R.S. 14:286 (1985). See also Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 83-869 (Oct. 18, 1983)
(stating that surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable as in violation of the criminal
statute prohibiting sale of minor children).
109. La. Civ. Code art. 1986. See 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 170, at 317-21, in 7
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
110. 2 S. Litvinoff, supra note 109, at 318 ("nemo praecise cogi potest ad factum").
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of the parties then becomes the issue of what other remedies may be
available to them.
Another aspect of these contracts that presents problems regarding
both remedies and enforceability is that they often transcend state bound-
aries. Frequently the contracting couple is located in one state, and the
surrogate in another."' This can create uncertainty regarding the law
applicable to the dispute, and special difficulties regarding custody of
the child and its removal from the state of its birth. 1 2 Because surrogacy
contracts touch upon several areas of the law-contracts and family
law, for example-the resolution of these questions through conflicts of
laws principles is complicated by uncertainty regarding which principles
to apply. This uncertainty may best be resolved through federal regulation
similar to the uniform acts regarding child support and custody." 3
In addition, the autonomy of the surrogate is largely guaranteed as
being within a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy.""H4 One po-
tential form of breach by the surrogate, that of terminating the preg-
nancy, is a matter of right, according to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Roe v. Wade;"' therefore specific performance of a
contractual clause prohibiting abortion may not be available. Though
most surrogacy contracts contain a provision that the surrogate will carry
the child to term, such a clause would probably be declared invalid in
the face of Roe." 6 Similarly, clauses granting to the biological father
the right of demanding an abortion-usually after amniocentesis indicates
the child is defective-could not stand."
7
Other potential breaches of the surrogacy agreement are similarly
difficult to remedy. It is convenient to consider these possible circum-
stances by the period of time during the performance of the contract
in which they occur." 8
111. Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform
Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 Geo. L.J. 1283, 1285, 1287; Special Project, supra note
30, at 666.
112. Note, supra note 111, at 1285. See also the jurisdictional discussion in the Baby
M. trial opinion. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 323-25, 525 A.2d 1128, 1132-33
(Ch. Div. 1987).
113. See, e.g., Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973); Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968). Federal regulation of surrogacy contracts has been
proposed in some commentaries. Special Project, supra note 30, at 664.
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). See infra notes
165-67 and accompanying text.
115. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
116. The Baby M. trial court struck such a provision as unconstitutional. 217 N.J.
Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159.
117. Such a clause would violate both Roe and Danforth. See infra note 171 and
accompanying text.
118. See generally Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas
for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 995-96 (1982); Note, supra note 16, at 609-17; Stark,
Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M. Decision, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 19 (1988).
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The surrogate may breach prior to artificial insemination simply by
changing her mind about her desire to participate in such an arrangement.
This is one of the easier breaches to deal with, since it is likely that
none of the parties will have yet significantly changed their position.
The contract could not be specifically enforced, as the surrogate's privacy
and bodily integrity are protected, and no court would order a party
to become pregnant and bear a child. 119
The surrogate probably would be liable for monetary damages, if
any could be proved.120 At this early point in the contractual relationship,
the contracting father probably would not have advanced great sums of
money.' 2' The disappointment of the contracting father's or couple's
expectations, however, may be great. In Louisiana, an award of non-
pecuniary damages would be possible 22 because the object of the contract
for the potential adopting couple would be a "sentimental" one. 123 The
court would be confronted with the unpleasant task of valuing the
potential life of a child and the potential parenting experience. The
contract "price"' 1 would arguably be an accurate starting point, al-
though that may be more a reflection of the value to the surrogate of
terminating her rights to the child than of the value to the contracting
couple for acquiring the same. In addition, the couple would have an
obligation to mitigate its damages. 25 This the couple most reasonably
could do by finding another surrogate, especially if they have contracted
through an agency. If the couple failed to make a reasonable effort to
reduce their damages, the surrogate could demand that an award be
reduced accordingly. 126
A breach by the contracting couple at this time could more easily
be compensated. The contract price would be a fair measure of damages
to the surrogate, as her interest would be primarily a pecuniary one. 27
Mitigation would be more difficult for the surrogate.
119. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. I11. U. L.J. 147, 167
(1980).
120. Keane, supra note 119, at 167.
121. However, Noel Keane requires a $2,000 initial fee and waiver of attorney liability
from the contracting father. Note, supra note Ill, at 1283, 1285 n.10 (1985).
122. La. Civ. Code art. 1998. See generally Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 La. L.
Rev. 1, 6-12 (1977).
123. La. Civ. Code art. 1998 comment (c).
124. An average figure for the fee actually paid to the surrogate is $10,000. Char-
acterizing this sum as the "price" reflects the author's bias toward a conclusion that the
true nature of the surrogacy contract more closely resembles one of sale than one for
services.
125. La. Civ. Code art. 2002.
126. Id.
127. A gratuitous surrogacy contract could present its own peculiar difficulties regarding
measure of damages as well as interesting questions related to cause and failure thereof.
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A breach by the surrogate may occur between insemination and
conception, usually in the form of her engaging in sexual intercourse
with a fertile man. 12 While it presents no particularly intractable legal
problems, the tragedy of this type of breach is that it usually is not
alleged or discovered until after the birth of the child, whose paternity
is then called into dispute. 129
Proof of paternity should not be an especially difficult problem
since increasingly accurate means are available for paternity testing.' 30
Such testing is frequently mandated by the terms of the contract.' If
the contracting father were shown not to be the biological father, his
obligation to take custody of and support the child would cease. The
surrogate may be liable for money damages for the father's emotional
loss, and would be required to make restitution of any amounts already
paid to her, including her medical expenses and legal fees.1 2 The more
serious problems presented by this type of breach are social. The con-
tracting father and his wife, if he is married, probably will not want
the child. The surrogate may also wish to be relieved of custody,
especially if the child suffers from a defect of some kind. 33 The result
is a child, quite possibly with special needs, who was created pursuant
to contract and is now cast adrift into the social services system, where
his chances of adoption are very slim. 11
128. Note, supra note 118, at 613.
129. Id. Mary Beth Whitehead alleged this type of breach in her efforts to keep the
child, though she knew and the court later discovered that her husband had had a
vasectomy several years previously. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. at 328-29, 525 A.2d
at 1135 (Ch. Div. 1987).
130. The HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) test can verify paternity with at least 97016
accuracy. See La. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1988) for procedures for paternity determination.
131. See N. Keane & D. Breo, supra note 13; Special Project, supra note 30, at 635
n.181.
132. Special Project, supra note 30, at 659; Note, supra note 16, at 631.
133. This "worst-case scenario" materialized in the Malahoff-Stiver incident described
at infra note 135. After paternity of the surrogate's husband was proved, they decided
to raise the child. However, the potential harms this child may suffer upon learning of
the disputes surrounding his birth are shameful.
134. Louisiana's Department of Health and Human Resources system handles 650-800
new "special needs" children each year. The Department's goal is to have an adoptable
child in the foster care system awaiting placement for not more than two years. This
goal is seldom met. In addition to the children for whom parental rights have already
been terminated, there are 5500-6000 more children in the foster care system who are
"potential" adoptees. Telephone conversations with Ms. Patsy Scott of DHHR's Office
of Adoptions, 25 Jan. 1988.
If the child were a normal, healthy infant, and the surrogate did not wish to retain
custody, the chances of adoption would be much greater.
It has been suggested in some proposals that the contracting father or couple be required
to post a bond with the state at the inception of the contract to indemnify the state
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In a notorious case involving such a breach, the surrogate and her
husband maintained that they were not informed of the necessity to
abstain from intercourse. The child was born with microcephaly, creating
the potential that he would be severely retarded. The contracting father
did not want the child and requested that medical treatment be withheld,
the surrogate declared she felt no maternal bond with the baby, and
all parties took their case to a public forum-the Phil Donahue Show.
The results of the paternity test were announced over the air on national
television-the surrogate's husband was the father.'35 The surrogate and
her husband sued the intermediaries for failing to instruct them properly,
and the biological father sued the surrogate for failing to produce the
child he "ordered. ' '1 6 In such a situation, the question arises whether
the surrogate who acted erroneously but in good faith could specifically
enforce the contracting father's obligation to pay.
The surrogate might also breach the contract during the course of
the pregnancy by means other than choosing to abort, with varying
potential remedies available to the contracting father. She may fail to
maintain an adequate standard of prenatal care or to follow contractually
specified prenatal medical instructions.'37 Again, the contracting father
or couple probably could not get specific relief, both because the sur-
rogate's bodily integrity is implicated and because extensive judicial
oversight of her behavior would be impracticable.'
In such a case, money damages may be awarded. The problem will
be one of causation. Even if the child suffered some demonstrable harm,
medical evidence linking that harm to the specific behavior of the
surrogate is quite likely to be speculative.3 9 This problem could, if
contemplated by the parties, be addressed through a schedule of liq-
uidated damages. This solution would still leave potentially difficult
problems of proof, and does nothing to address the most serious prob-
lem-what to do with the child. It may initially seem unfair to require
should the child become a ward, especially in the case of a child born with defects or
special needs. Note, supra note 111, at 1297, 1304. Mr. Malahoff, for example, had
stated that if the child, born severely retarded, were shown to be his, he planned to
relinquish it to the state. Id. at 1297 n.1l0, see infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
135. Note, supra note 111, at 1283, 1285 (describing the Malahoff-Stiver incident).
136. Special Project, supra note 30, at 659 n.308.
137. Note, supra note 118, at 613. Some contracts specify that the surrogate may not
drink, smoke, or use drugs, and that she must adhere to a given schedule of prenatal
medical care. Note, supra note 135, at 1306.
138. Lorio, supra note 118, at 995. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on
State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1981).
139. Note, supra note 16, at 633. Most birth defects are spontaneous disruptions of
the normal developmental process which are not easily traceable to specific causes. Those
which are genetically traceable would be more related to improper screening than to
improper conduct of the surrogate during pregnancy.
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the contracting couple to take a defective child when they were probably
powerless to stop or remedy the breach as it was occurring. 14 However,
the obligation to take or at least support the child must be an ironclad
one for policy reasons. In addition, while the surrogate's behavior may
arguably have increased the statistical probability of some birth defect,
a certain risk of such an outcome is inherent in every pregnancy14' and
is a risk that the adopting parents should be considered to have willingly
assumed. The father would be equally powerless to control the mother's
conduct whether she is his wife or a surrogate, because of her rights .
of privacy and bodily integrity. Therefore, the risk to him, of having
a less than "perfect" child, should be considered to be the same in
both circumstances.
It has been suggested in some commentaries that the child also may
have remedies under the contract as a third-party beneficiary. 142 To
institute a suit under this theory on behalf of the child, one must show
that the child was an intended beneficiary under the terms of the contract
requiring adequate prenatal care, rather than merely an incidental ben-
eficiary thereof as a result of his link to the biological mother. 143 Rep-
resentatives of the child may also bring an action in tort in the nature
of a "wrongful life" action, although the viability of such a suit is
uncertain in Louisiana.'"
In addition to contractual remedies, the contracting father may have
remedies in tort. 145 In the case of breach by abortion, the availability
of a remedy under the contract is doubtful. If the surrogate constitu-
tionally could not be prevented from exercising this option,'"4 relief
therefore could not be granted. The contracting father may choose to
seek recovery through a wrongful death action, 47 though he may be
140. Specific performance or injunctive relief at the time of the breach is not realistically
possible. See discussion at supra note 138.
141. There is approximately a 3% probability that any pregnancy, even under "ideal"
conditions, will result in a child born with an anomaly. N. Eastman & L. Hellman,
Williams Obstetrics 1105 (12th ed. 1961).
142. Note, supra note 16, at 635.
143. La. Civ. Code arts. 1985 (contracts produce effects for third parties only when
provided by law); 1978 (contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third person called
a third party beneficiary). See generally S. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations in the
Louisiana Jurisprudence 311-30 (1985) (distinguishing between third party beneficiaries and
incidental beneficiaries).
144. See Comment, Wrongful Life: Should the Action Be Allowed?, 47 La. L. Rev.
1319 (1987). This author does not advocate the use of such a cause of action for the
policy reasons presented so well in the cited comment.
145. Note, supra note 16, at 632-36. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
147. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981) (allowing recovery for death
of an unborn child due to a tortfeasor's negligence). It is uncertain whether such a suit
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similarly limited by constitutional protections of the surrogate's decision
to abort. In addition, the biological father's wife, even if she is a party
to the contract, may not have standing to bring an action for the
wrongful death of a child to which she was not biologically, and not
yet legally, related.' 41
The surrogate may breach the agreement after the birth of the child
by refusing to relinquish custody to the contracting father. This type
of breach presents perhaps the thorniest issues regarding enforceability.
As the constitutional protections that were operative in some of the
types of breach previously reviewed are not implicated here, the solution
is not as readily determinable. 149 Specific performance is a possibility,
but the image of wresting a baby from its mother's arms is surely not
a pleasant one for a court. The Baby M. trial court ordered specific
performance, but essentially grounded its decision in a custody-type
analysis of the best interests of the child.150 Had the parties been dif-
ferent, the outcome may also have been.
Various proposals have been advanced for resolving this type of
situation, ranging from suggestions that the surrogate be permitted to
void the contract or to revoke her consent to relinquish the child'' to
suggestions that there should be a presumption against the surrogate
based on the contract as evidence of abandonment.1 2 Courts have also
declared that the state's adoption laws are superior to the contract
because of the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of
would be successful in the case of an intentional tort (if indeed constitutionally protected
abortion could legally constitute an intentional tort), where the fetus was in the first
trimester of development. The fetus in Danos was 6-7 months gestational age, at which
point viability is possible.
148. See Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Serv., 381 So. 2d 396 (La. 1980). In
Roche, minor children who were in the legal custody of a couple in the process of
adopting them could not recover for the wrongful death of their "father," as no final
decree had issued. This would suggest the converse, that a prospective adoptive parent
could not recover for the death of the child to be adopted. See also La. Civ. Code arts.
2315.1 and 2315.2.
149. But see Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M. Decision, 11 Harv. Women's
L.J. at 45 (suggesting that specific performance in this situation raises Thirteenth Amend-
ment questions).
150. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 398, 525 A.2d 1128, 1170 (Ch. Div. 1987).
151. See Lacey, The Law of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood in
Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 Tulsa L.J. 281, 321 (1987). Bills
in Hawaii, Connecticut, and Minnesota state that the court shall decide if the surrogate
shall be permitted to keep the baby. The surrogate must show by clear and convincing
evidence that it is in the child's best interest to remain with her. Note, supra note 100,
at 898 & n.122.
152. Special Project, supra note 30, at 659.
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children. 53 This approach would seem to dictate that the surrogacy
contract not be enforced and that the child's placement be determined
instead on the basis of a standard custody evaluation.
If custody is not awarded to the biological father, either through
specific performance or a "best interests" custody resolution, money
damages are not likely to be adequate. In addition, a problem inherent
in any recovery against the surrogate-particularly in this situation where
she will probably not be receiving her "compensation"-is that she is
likely to be impecunious. 54 In the event that the biological father refuses
to take custody, and the child is shown to be his, the surrogate could
probably recover child support if she wished to retain custody. 5
The contracting father or couple may also breach the surrogacy
contract. This is most likely to occur after the birth of the child, either
by a refusal to take custody of the child or a refusal to pay the surrogate.
The obligation to pay the surrogate is perhaps the easiest provision of
the contract to enforce and should present no difficult legal questions.
However, it is not likely that specific performance of the obligation to
adopt a child would be ordered,'5 6 though the biological father's duty
to support the child could be enforced, based on his statutory obligations
as a parent, rather than his contractual obligations.
5 7
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
It is generally within the realm of state law to decide questions and
make policy choices regarding the health and status of persons and the
153. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987); Surrogate
Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). Cf.
Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 611, 621 (1978) ("Since the central
concerns of custody law would be equally well served by an award to either parent,
reference to a non-child-centered criterion for decision is appropriate.") (emphasis added).
154. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 150.
155. Note, supra note 16, at 635; La. R.S. 46:236.1 (1986).
156. Lorio, supra note 118, at 996.
157. This presents some difficulty, depending upon the child's status regarding legit-
imacy. If the surrogate's husband did not consent, he may disavow paternity. The child
would then be illegitimate. La. Civ. Code art. 188. If the biological father does not
acknowledge the child, his obligation for support will rest upon a determination of his
paternity. See La. R.S. 9:399 (Supp. 1988). It is possible for the state of Louisiana
through the DHHR to institute proceedings to determine paternity. Upon finding that a
man is the biological father, support may be ordered, even though the child has a presumed
legal father, i.e. the husband of the mother. See La. R.S. 46:236.1 (Supp. 1988).
See generally the discussions of damages and specific performance in the Iowa Model
Act, supra note 33. Specific performance was not permitted. In the case of a breach by
the surrogate, the contracting couple was entitled to recover the fee paid as well as any
health care expenditures, if the surrogate refuses to be inseminated, had a non-medically
necessary abortion, or decided to keep the child. In the case of a material breach by the
intended parents, the surrogate had the right to keep the child, to recover her fee and
expenses, and to file for child support from the contracting couple. Section 6-106, Iowa
Model Act, supra note 33.
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enforceability of contracts. These decisions are, however, subject to
constitutional limitations and are open to constitutional challenge. The
proposed fronts of attack on regulation or prohibition of surrogate
motherhood contracts are the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
A. Due Process and Privacy
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process.' Though early in the development of fourteenth
amendment law it was construed simply as a procedural protection, the
due process clause has evolved into a limitation on legislative power to
interfere with substantive rights.' 5 9 The nature and extent of the interests
so protected are still being defined, but the idea is firmly established
that "[t]here are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot
rightfully go.' 16
Neither the fourteenth amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution specifically guarantees a right to privacy. Nonetheless, the
right to freedom from governmental intrusion is very much a part of
our cultural heritage and has been developing as a constitutional concept
over much of the last century. 161 This protection from governmental
intrusion was first an issue in the context of criminal procedural safe-
guards and was found to emanate from the fourth and fifth amend-
ments.162
The developing law of substantive due process began to recognize
a right to make decisions regarding certain traditionally personal matters
with a minimum of governmental intrusion or control, though this
freedom was not then couched in terms of a right to privacy. These
protected liberty interests were centered around decisions concerning
family, marriage and children. 163 In addition, marriage and procreation
were declared to be "fundamental" rights in the equal protection case
of Skinner v. Oklahoma.164 These cases paved the way for the devel-
opment of a right to privacy, a right that was finally explicitly formulated
and refined in the contraception and abortion cases.
158. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
159. See generally P. Kauper & F. Beytagh, supra note 20, at 699-700.
160. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661, 8 S. Ct. 273, 297 (1887).
161. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572-73 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
163. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
164. 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) (overturning a state statute requiring man-
datory sterilization for certain types of convicted repeat offenders).
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1. Contraception and Abortion Cases
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons. The
Court enunciated the idea of a "zone of privacy" created not by any
specific provisions of the Constitution, but by so-called "penumbras"
emanating from the enumerated guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. 66
Notably, the Court seemed to ground its decision in a desire to protect
marital privacy, finding the governmental intrusion at issue "repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 1 67
This link between privacy in procreative decisions and the traditional
marital relationship was apparently weakened by the Court's subsequent
opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird.16 In this equal protection challenge to
a Massachusetts statute permitting distribution of contraceptives to mar-
ried persons but denying the same to single persons, the Court found
no rational basis for a distinction based on marital status. In oft-quoted
language that has led to much confusion and speculation regarding the
nature of the procreative right, it stated that "if the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.' 1 69
It is not immediately clear from the Eisenstadt opinion whether the
Court's concern was based upon the right to privacy, the right to intimate
association, or practical considerations of the effects of an unwanted
pregnancy or child. Nor is it clear whether the protected interest is as
specific as access to contraceptives or as broad as freedom in sexual
relationships. 70 One year later, the Court further expanded the notion
of privacy without significantly clarifying its logical base. Roe v. Wade7'
stands for the proposition that the state does not have interests sufficient
to outweigh a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy during the first
trimester. The Court did not go so far as to recognize a right to "do
with one's body as one pleases.' ' 7 2 Indeed, while applying the usually
fatal strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that the state's interests
165. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
166. Justice Douglas found the privacy right emanated from guarantees in the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, applicable by the doctrine of incorporation
through the fourteenth amendment.
167. 381 U.S. at 486, 85 S. Ct. at 1682.
168. 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
169. Id. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1038.
170. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 528-29 (1983).
171. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
172. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
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did become sufficiently compelling to warrant intrusion into this zone
of privacy at some point during pregnancy. 173
It was still unclear, however, exactly from where the right to this
particular zone of privacy derived. The opinion explicitly stated the
belief that the right to privacy is grounded in the fourteenth amend-
ment, 174 but acknowledged that the only personal interests which may
be thus protected are those which are " 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' "171 The Court indulged in an extensive examination of
the historical treatment of abortion, apparently in an effort to justify
its conclusion that such an interest is implicit in the Anglo-American
concept of "ordered liberty."
In addition, after recognizing that the woman is not alone in her
claims to life and liberty, as she is carrying another individual, the
Court stated that "it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide
that at some point in time another interest ... becomes significantly
involved.' 176 It then went on, however, to substitute its own judgment
on this policy issue for that of the state whose right to decide it had
just acknowledged. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, likened
this disposition to the more activist Lochner era of economic substantive
due process. 177
173. The state's interest in protecting maternal health was deemed to begin with the
end of the first trimester, while the interest in protection of fetal life began with the end
of the second trimester. During the second trimester, the state could regulate to protect
maternal health, and during the third trimester the state could prohibit abortion to protect
the unborn child. Id. at 163-64, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
174. Id. at 153, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
175. Id. at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325,
58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937)).
176. Id. at 159, 93 S. Ct. at 730. One commentator has said:
In a sense, a pregnant woman and an unborn child each has her own kind
of claim on the interests of life and liberty .... The proposition that a pregnant
woman may unilaterally determine the fate of an unborn child is no easier to
defend than the proposition that a state may unilaterally require a pregnant
woman to carry an unborn child to its birth, especially when doing so poses
no serious risk to her. How the matter is determined turns entirely on the choice
one makes, a priori, about the nature of an unborn child. Given the Court's
implicit assumption that a fetus is not close enough to being either 'life' or a
'person' to warrant its own constitutional protection, Roe is consistent with the
constitutional interest in advancing the private sanctity of childbearing decisions.
Without that assumption, Roe must simply be rejected.
Hafen, supra note 170, at 533 n.341.
177. 410 U.S. at 174, 93 S. Ct. at 737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist also
pointed out that the Court in its historical analysis overlooked the fact that a majority
of jurisdictions had proscribed abortion for approximately a century, indicating that the
"right" to an abortion was perhaps not so implicit in our concept of ordered liberty as
the majority would indicate.
It has also been suggested that Roe was the pinnacle of a privacy/substantive due
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The right to privacy and the right of access to contraceptives and
abortion were further secured in the cases that followed. In Carey v.
Population Services International,178 the Court struck down a New York
statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives to minors. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 79 it was held that consent for an abortion
could not be required from a pregnant woman's parent or spouse.
2. Is There a Fundamental Right to Procreate?
It has been asserted that the Skinner-Griswold-Roe line of cases has
established that there is a fundamental affirmative right to procreate
that is within the protected zone of privacy. 80 If this view is correct,
any efforts by state legislatures to regulate or prohibit the practice of
surrogate motherhood would be subject to strict scrutiny and would
therefore probably not pass constitutional muster.' Such an affirmative
right is, however, an unwarranted extension of the right to privacy.8 2
Moreover, even assuming that an affirmative right to procreate exists,
its scope does not encompass the practice of surrogate motherhood. In
addition, the Court has recently moved in the direction of limiting the
expansive privacy rights that it granted during the last two decades.1 3
If, for whatever reason, there is no fundamental right to procreate
through the use of surrogacy, the state may regulate or even prohibit
the practice. Essentially, there are two necessary inquiries: whether there
exists an affirmative right to procreate, and, if so, whether there exists
a right to do so through the use of surrogates.
Certainly the language in Eisenstadt regarding the "decision whether
to bear or beget a child' ' 8 4 has fueled the controversy over whether
there is an affirmative right to procreate.'85 However, it cannot be
process curve which is now falling off with increasing rapidity, much the same fate
encountered by economic substantive due process after the Lochner era. This would cut
against Roe as a basis for any further extension of privacy rights such as would be
necessary to find a fundamental right to procreate. See Hafen, supra note 170; at 523.
178. 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
179. 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
180. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23; Special Project, supra note 30;
Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 669, 678 (1985).
181. Strict scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate a compelling interest which is
served by the legislation, that the statute be necessary to achieve the state's compelling
goal, and that it be narrowly tailored to achieve that end. This standard of review is
seldom successfully met. See generally P. Kauper & F. Beytagh, supra note 20, at 876,
1085-90.
182. O'Brien, supra note 23.
183. See infra text accompanying note 207.
184. 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. 1038.
185. See supra note 180.
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contested that the contraception and abortion cases clearly dealt with
the right not to procreate. If the affirmative converse exists, it must be
logically inferable from the intent and reasoning of the Court in these
and related cases.
In Skinner, the Court spoke of the right to procreate as being
fundamental to the perpetuation of society and one of the most basic
civil rights of man. 1 6 In context, though, the Court was only preserving
the capacity to procreate, that is, protecting the petitioner's existing
reproductive capability against permanent deprivation by the state. The
opinion left intact the state's right to decide when and within what
relationships that capacity could be exercised.'8 7 Consistent with this
observation, some commentators have stated that the right to procreate
arises out of the right to procreate naturally, suggesting that the
unmarried' 8 or infertile' 9 may therefore not have this protected interest.
At least one author views the contraception and abortion cases as
being spawned in and by an era of great social upheaval regarding the
roles of women in society, and describes the Court as seizing the op-
portunity to alleviate the stigma and burden imposed upon women
because of pregnancy and to protect their right to choose a childless
lifestyle in a changing society more accepting of career women and
childless marriages.' 9 The Court is also said to have recognized the
disproportionate share of the burden of procreation borne by women,
as well as women's greater exposure to social harms from an unwed
pregnancy. There may be some validity to this theory. Certainly the
Court has responded to and even instigated social reform. 9' Further,
the Roe opinion did state that the woman's right was worthy of pro-
tection because of the potential burdens involved in imposing upon her
an unwanted pregnancy or child or the stigma of unwed motherhood. 92
186. 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
187. Justice Goldberg stated in his Griswold concurrence that the constitutionality of
Connecticut's laws against fornication and adultery was "beyond doubt." 381 U.S. at
498, 85 S. Ct. at 1689. Justice Harlan also stated in his widely respected dissent in Poe
v. Ullman that
the laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may
be used and the legal and social context in which children are born and brought
up . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life
that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
367 U.S. at 546, 81 S. Ct. at 1778 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
188. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23, at 417.
189. Lacey, supra note 151, at 308-09.
190. Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 291, 307-15 (1982).
191. Consider, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct.
753 (1955) and its progeny.
192. 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
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To the extent that this characterization of Roe and its progeny is valid,
it would seem to militate against the notion that inherent in those
opinions was an intention by the Court to ensure an affirmative right
to procreate.
Nor can such an affirmative right be justified on the basis of the
personal autonomy in procreational decisions that was protected by this
line of cases. Individual autonomy is a supportable basis for protecting
rights only so long as only the individual is involved. The right to have
sex without procreating is one matter, but the right to procreate, with
or without sex, is something else entirely. In the latter case, the rights
of other individuals become implicated in the decisions being made.
Even Roe recognized that at viability the state's interest in protecting
the child justifies complete prohibition of abortion under some circum-
stances, despite the woman's fundamental right to privacy in choosing
to abort. 93 Therefore, the autonomy and privacy interests recognized
were necessarily limited in scope, and it cannot be assumed that they
include an affirmative right to create a child.
In addition, given the language in Eisenstadt to the effect that if
the right to privacy is to have any significance it must be the right of
the individual, it could be safely assumed that an affirmative right to
procreate must extend equally to both men and women. However, a
man's right to procreate could not be of fundamental significance if it
can be cut off by the unilateral decision of his partner to abort the
child. 94
Even if there is an affirmative right to procreate, reproduction
through the use of a surrogate mother would not be found within the
boundaries of the zone of protection.' 9" Professor John Robertson of
the University of Texas at Austin, referring to the Griswold-Roe line
of cases, has stated that "[tihe principle underlying these holdings in-
cludes the right of a married couple to have children coitally. If so, it
is difficult to see how noncoital, collaborative reproduction by married
persons can be treated differently."'' 96
193. Id. at 163-64, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
194. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
195. Much has been written regarding the right to procreate as it relates to various
reproductive technologies other than surrogacy. They are beyond the scope of this paper.
See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 151; Lorio, supra note 118; Special Project, supra note 30;
Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23; Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Pro-
creative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 942
(1986) thereinafter Robertson, New Reproduction]; Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Third
Party Motherhood and the Changing Definition of Legal Parent, 17 Pac. L.J. 231 (1985);
Williams, Differential Treatment of Men and Women By Artificial Reproduction Statutes,
21 Tulsa L.J. 463 (1986).
196. Billig, High Tech Earth Mothering, 9 District Lawyer, July/Aug. 1985, at 56,
57 (quoting Prof. Robertson's testimony before the House Committee on Science &
Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Aug. 8, 1984.)
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Robertson created the theory of breaking reproduction into its com-
ponent roles-genetic, gestational, and social parenting-each of which
he believes merits constitutional protection.'97 He further suggests that
one has the right to procreate by participating in arrangements by which
these components are shared among various parties. 98 However, this
comes very close to espousing a theory of the right to do with one's
body as one chooses, which was specifically rejected by the Roe Court.199
A right to procreate does not necessitate the state's ensuring that
one has the means to do so. In Maher v. Roe,2 0 the Court rejected
the notion that because a woman has a fundamental right to a first-
trimester abortion she has the right to receive public assistance to pay
for it, even though the refusal to supply funding effectively deprives
her of her only means of obtaining the procedure. As the Court stated
in a later case, "[The state] need not remove those [obstacles] not of
its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category." '20 ' Nor is the
inability to have children a creation of the state. Even if surrogacy
contracts are prohibited, the government does not stand in the way of
procreation-infertility does. One commentator observed that extending
a right to procreate to the use of surrogates creates a right to be a
parent when it has been established that there is no inherent right to
adopt a child. 20 2
It cannot be assumed that the right to procreate should include the
right to do so by any means. One would not be likely to prevail with
an argument of entitlement to procreate through extramarital intercourse.
Substantive due process does not protect blindly even enumerated rights
in the name of personal liberty. As an example, the protection of free
expression is not predicated simply on the notion that restraining one
from speaking freely improperly interferes with personal autonomy.
Rather, free expression serves larger societal interests that ultimately
benefit all individuals. Likewise, privacy rights must be linked to societal
goals or interests larger than the autonomy of the individual involved.
This is reflected in the notions of "looking to the collective conscience
of the people" 203 and interests "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' '204
197. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23, at 408-10.
198. "One thinks of oneself as procreating whether one conceives without gestating
or rearing, gestates without rearing or conceiving, or rears without conceiving or gestating.
Procreative freedom includes the right to separate the genetic, gestational, or social
components of reproduction and to recombine them in collaboration with others." Id.
at 410.
199. 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
200. 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
201. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2688 (1980).
202. Lacey, supra note 151, at 309.
203. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934).
204. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937).
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If the attributes of procreation that first raised it to the level of a
fundamental right are shared by surrogate motherhood, then the practice
of surrogacy may be similarly protected. 205 Skinner and Griswold ad-
dressed the importance of privacy and procreative choice to marital
intimacy and social stability. The abortion cases added considerations
of bodily integrity, prevention of social stigma, and avoidance of the
imposition of a parent-child relationship upon an unwilling party. The
creation of children by contract serves few, if any, of these ends. Bringing
a third party into the procreative relationship cannot be justified on a
theory of marital intimacy, and the strain such an arrangement puts
upon traditional notions of parenthood and family does little to further
social stability. Rather than avoiding an unwanted parent-child rela-
tionship, surrogate motherhood has the potential of destroying the re-
lationship of at least one parent with the child. 206
The Court itself has recently given signs of narrowing somewhat
the bounds of the right of privacy. It has on at least two occasions
upheld prohibitions against homosexual acts on the ground that such
acts were not within a recognized privacy interest. In Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 207 the Court through Justice White firmly rejected the argument
that the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of cases implies a constitutional
protection of sexual conduct of any kind between consenting adults. 20 1
He also indicated that the Court's fundamental privacy rights analysis
had become too expansive, saying:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the
Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore,
great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed
to be fundamental. 209
If the Court characterized surrogacy as an unnecessary expansion of the
right of married couples to procreate through natural means, it would
probably not accord this practice the status of a fundamental right.210
Given that the Court is now less likely to read new rights into the due
204. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937).
205. See generally Robertson, New Reproduction, supra note 195, at 956.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 278-81.
207. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
208. Id. at 2844.
209. Id. at 2846; see also Lacey, supra note 151, at 292.
210. Lacey, supra note 151, at 292.
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process clause, it seems likely that surrogate motherhood would not
receive constitutional protection.2 1 1
Even if there were a constitutional right to procreate which included
the use of surrogates, or if the surrogate's privacy interest in procreating
in this fashion were recognized, such protection need not and probably
would not extend to the payment of surrogacy fees. Though it has been
conceded by virtually all that prohibiting payment of surrogates would
effectively eliminate the practice, 2 2 the government need not ensure the
viability of commercial surrogacy. Lower courts have stated that the
right to procreate does not include the payment of fees in connection
with the transfer of parental rights. 213 In addition, the Supreme Court
has held that states are under no obligation to fund elective abortions,
even if the failure to do so destroys a woman's only meaningful chance
of access to the procedure. 2 14 Notably, two of these cases2 5 specifically
permit local governmental policy choices indicating a "preference for
normal childbirth. "216
Given the foregoing analysis, the state's ability to regulate or prohibit
the practice of surrogate motherhood should not be impaired seriously
by potential constitutional challenges based on substantive due process
and the right of privacy, or upon an affirmative right to procreate.
B. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment also provides that no state may deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2 7
Originally understood as a guarantee of impartial enforcement of the
laws, this clause has become a guarantee that the law itself must be
impartial. 21 1 Classifications of persons for the purpose of determining
their treatment under the law must be justified. Generally speaking,
211. There has been a growing dissent on the abortion cases decided since Roe. Justice
O'Connor, for one, has suggested that the rationale employed in the Roe decision needs
to be reexamined. Given this, and the recent addition of Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
the future of procreative privacy rights is quite possibly limited.
212. Keane, supra note 119, at 153; Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex
rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 216 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
213. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); In re Baby M.,
217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987).
214. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
215. Poelker, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977); Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct.
2376 (1977).
216. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521, 97 S. Ct. at 2392. These cases also raised equal
protection challenges due to a wealth-based discrimination, which were rejected.
217. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.
218. "[Tihe equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070 (1886).
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deference is granted to legislative determinations of reasonable classi-
fication schemes, requiring only that the distinction be rationally related
to the accomplishment of a legitimate government purpose. However,
when the scheme is based upon certain classifications deemed to be
"suspect," the law in question will receive some heightened level of
judicial scrutiny. 21 9 In addition, if the law deprives a class of persons
of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny will be invoked.220
Proposed regulation or prohibition of surrogate motherhood con-
tracts has provoked allegations of discriminatory effect based on gender,
wealth, and marital status. In addition, the claim of a fundamental right
to procreate has raised the possibility of a requirement of strict judicial
scrutiny of these proposed laws. In the sections that follow, the argu-
ments surrounding claims of gender-based and marital status-based dis-
crimination will be examined. 22' The arguments regarding procreation as
a fundamental right were discussed in the previous section . 22
1. Classification by Gender-AID and Surrogacy
Artificial insemination by donor (AID) is a generally accepted prac-
tice and receives some protection under the law. 22 13 In Louisiana, as
elsewhere, a couple who chooses to procreate through the use of AID
is aided by a rebuttable presumption of paternity in the husband of the
mother, operative when he has given his consent to the insemination. 224
In states where the practice is more closely regulated, sperm donors are
given the added protection of automatic severance of any parental rights
or responsibilities.225
Proponents of surrogate motherhood contracts argue that a prohi-
bition of this practice would amount to a deprivation of equal protection,
in that infertile men (or their partners) are able to procreate through
the use of AID but infertile women (or their partners) are denied the
219. See generally P. Kauper & F. Beytagh, supra note 20, at 876; J. Barron & C.
Dienes, Constitutional Law in a Nutshell 157-70 (1986).
220. See generally P. Kauper & F. Beytagh, supra note 20, at 876; J. Barron & C.
Dienes, supra note 219, at 157-70.
221. The problems related to wealth arise chiefly because of the expense of surrogacy,
and present a potential constitutional challenge when proposed or enacted legislation
prescribes minimum fees for surrogates. The problems were addressed in the cases con-
cerning the funding of abortions. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 180-216.
223. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
224. La. Civ. Code art. 188.
225. See Cal. Civ. Code § 7005 (b) (1983); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-69j (1981); Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-6-106 (2) (1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.239 (1984); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 12.03 (b) (1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
891.40 (2) (Supp. 1987).
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same opportunity.2 26 Equal protection analysis generally requires that the
groups being compared, allegedly unfavorably, be similarly situated with
respect to the law and that the parties be confined to their group by
"immutable characteristics. "227 While gender is arguably an immutable
characteristic, the groups just described are dissimilarly situated in at
least two respects.
First, sperm donors and surrogate mothers are simply not analogous
parties. There is ample reason to sever the parental rights and respon-
sibilities of a sperm donor whose only link to the child he helps create
is a few minutes spent in solitude contributing a specimen. He neither
sees the child nor intends any relationship with it.22s He takes no ap-
preciable risk. The surrogate mother, by contrast, takes all the physical
risk and spends nine months in intimate association with the child. Even
given her intention to relinquish the baby at birth, she develops a
relationship with the child during gestation that can be extremely pow-
erful. There is more than sufficient justification for differential treat-
ment, and for preventing a mother from irrevocably consenting to
relinquish a child with whom she will become so involved over the
course of the agreement.
Very little is likely to happen to the sperm donor between the time
of his donation and the birth of his child, a child whose existence to
him is purely hypothetical and probably never known. By contrast, what
will happen to the surrogate between the time of her consent and the
birth may be one of the most profound experiences of her life. Nor
are these groups being denied equal access to the same or even very
similar procedures. On the contrary, the procedures are totally dissimilar.
The distinctions based on gender, which accord different treatment to
sperm donors and surrogate mothers, are therefore rational. As the
parties are not similarly situated in any meaningful respect, the gender-
based equal protection challenge is unavailing. These distinctions may
also be viewed as satisfying the intermediate scrutiny test of substantial
relationship to an important state interest by protection of the parental
relationship and provision for assuring legitimacy. Either way, the pro-
tests under this theory, while vocal, 229 are unpersuasive.
226. Note, supra note 6, at 882; Lacey, supra note 151, at 309 & n.154; Note, supra
note 180, at 669; Williams, supra note 195, at 471-83.
227. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783
n.4 (1938).
228. In a California case which constituted an exception, the sperm donor and the
mother were friends. The father succeeded in obtaining visitation privileges. This type of
situation was contemplated by the authors of the Iowa Model Act, supra note 33. See
Rules of Parentage § 2-102.
229. See Note, supra note 180; Lacey, supra note 151, at 309 & n.154; Williams,
supra note 195, at 471-83.
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In addition, the presumption of paternity that serves a necessary
legal function illustrates a valid gender distinction. In the usual case,
the mother of a child is obvious at birth. 230 The paternity required to
legitimate the child may be less obvious. The presumption supplies the
"fact" of identity of the child's father. 23' The presumption of maternity
in the contracting father's wife that has been proposed by some surrogacy
advocates232 makes very little real sense, as there is no missing fact of
identity of the child's mother.233
2. Classification by Marital Status
Proposed statutes that limit the use of surrogacy to married persons
or prohibit it entirely have been challenged on the basis that they
discriminate against unmarried persons who are unable or unwilling to
procreate in any other way. 234 Proponents of such challenges frequently
assert associational interests in protection of nontraditional families, 235
and allege that the state cannot arbitrarily elevate form over substance. 236
These challenges also may involve charges of discrimination based on
sexual preference masked in a marital status classification.
217
Again, a consideration of the situation of the parties and the state's
justification for their differential treatment collapse to an extent into
one analysis. While Eisenstadt and Danforth clearly establish the Court's
willingness to extend to the married and unmarried alike the right to
prevent parenthood, it is extremely difficult to imagine that the analogy
would hold in a determination of the right to create children and families.
Certain types of form traditionally have been upheld without a charge
of sacrificing substance. Prohibitions against polygamy and homosexual
marriage are not likely to fall soon. 238 The definition of family, it is
230. In the case of embryo transfer, whole new questions arise as to who is the mother
of the child-the genetic or gestational participant. This article is confined to the more
"typical" surrogacy arrangement of AID plus a genetic/gestational mother.
231. In Louisiana, as in many other jurisdictions, this fact may be disproved by the
use of medical tests. See La. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1988).
232. See Note, supra note 16, at 619.
233. It does solve some legal problems, chiefly the possibility of the natural mother
claiming any legal rights to the child. This is essentially a policy issue.
234. Note, supra note 180, at 678-80; Lacey, supra note 151, at 307.
235. Note, supra note 180, at 678-80; Lacey, supra note 151, at 315. See also, Hafen,
supra note 170.
236. Note, supra note 180, at 678-79.
237. See generally Lacey, supra note 151, at 299.
238. See La. Civ. Code arts. 88, 89 (formerly La. Civ. Code arts. 93, 88 (1870),
respectively); Succ. of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So. 860 (1947); Succ. of Thomas, 144
La. 25, 80 So. 186 (1919).
[Vol. 49
COMMENTS
true, is changing. 2 9 The Court has recognized an atypical "family"
unit's right to choose to live together. 240 However, there is a huge
difference between choosing housing arrangements and bringing children
into the world, whose interests the state has the right and responsibility
of protecting.
Nor does the argument necessarily hold that because the state allows
single persons to adopt,241 it must recognize their right to form a family
through surrogacy. 242 The state's justification in extending the right to
adopt to single persons may have had more to do with meeting an
existing need for adoptive parents than with recognizing unmarried per-
sons' family rights. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that a
state may by law give preference to married couples in the adoption
context. 243 While reasonable minds could conclude that single parents
are not a societal evil which must be discouraged, they could also agree
that the state has sufficient interests in protecting or limiting children
born through extraordinary means.
VI. LAW, SOCIAL POLICY, AND ETHICS
The final deliberation that must be undertaken in an examination
of the issues involved in surrogacy agreements is how these contracts
may conflict with existing law, social policy, and ethics. Assuming that
they were made enforceable, these contracts potentially conflict with
provisions of Louisiana law regarding adoption, paternity and legitimacy,
the marital relationship, and the criminal sanctions against child-selling.
Each of these will be examined briefly, with a general discussion of
policy and ethical issues following.
A. Paternity and Filiation
If the surrogate is married, her husband is presumed to be the father
of all children conceived or born to her during the marriage. 244 The
husband may rebut this presumption upon proper proof in an action
en desaveu,245 timely filed. 24 If he has consented to her artificial in-
239. See Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform
Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 Geo. L.J. 1283 (1985); Note, supra note 195; Wadlington,
Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 Va. L. Rev. 465 (1983).
240. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
241. All states currently permit unmarried persons to adopt. Note, supra note 180, at
669 n.5. See La. R.S. 9:422 (Supp. 1988).
242. Note, supra note 180, at 669-70.
243. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1767 (1978).
244. La. Civ. Code art. 184.
245. La. Civ. Code art. 187.
246. La. Civ. Code art. 189. Suit must be filed within 180 days after the husband
learned or should have learned of the birth, with the time limit suspended if he could
not file suit for reasons beyond his control.
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semination, he loses the privilege of disavowal. 247 It must be noted,
however, that he is the presumed father regardless of his consent. Even
if he did not consent, he is not compelled to exercise his right to
disavow. He may choose to recognize the child as his own. This is
obviously a potential problem in the surrogacy context. If a married
surrogate refuses to relinquish custody of the child and the contract is
unenforceable, it becomes necessary to identify who has parental rights
relative to the child, what the nature and extent of those rights may
be, and what action may be necessary to secure them.24s
The policy most fundamental to this area of the law is the protection
of the legitimacy of children. 249 For this reason, the presumption of
legal paternity is "rigorously applied.''"20 Nevertheless, the biological
father of a child, not his legitimate issue, has rights which are worthy
of at least some degree of protection. 251 Such a father may bring an
"avowal" action to attempt to establish his paternity and thereby obtain
some parental rights, 25 2 or may otherwise legally and formally acknowl-
edge the child and institute proceedings against the mother to secure
his parental rights. This does not, however, alter the legitimacy or the
legal filiation of the child, who remains the presumed legal offspring
of the surrogate's husband.253 By contrast, it must be pointed out that
247. La. Civ. Code art. 188.
248. See Sections 2-101, 2-102 of the Iowa Model Act, supra note 33, which provides
that the birth mother is the presumed legal mother, and her husband is the presumed
legal father-a rebuttable presumption similar to that operative in Louisiana; in addition,
sperm donors may choose to be recognized and be granted parental rights, and in the
face of two conflicting presumptions the court is directed to ascertain paternity according
to "the weightier considerations of policy and logic, a discretionary standard that should
be read in light of the intent of the parties. ... Id. comment to section 2-102.
249. Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287, 293 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (referring to
"this state's strong and deeply-rooted policy of avoiding the bastardization of innocent
children").
250. Hodges v. Hodges, 348 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
251. The United States Supreme Court has accorded biological fathers of illegitimate
children limited protection under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. The
degree of protection has depended upon the level of actual involvement and participation
by the father in the child's life. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985
(1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208
(1972). These due process rights were recognized in the Louisiana opinion in Finnerty v.
Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). It is unclear how the analysis would
run in the case of a newborn child whose custody was disputed, as the biological father
would not yet have had any opportunity to establish a relationship with the child.
252. Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). See Comment, The Child
With Two Fathers: Updating the Wisdom of Solomon, 46 La. L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (1986).
253. Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d at 293-96.
The process of filiation itself is one primarily establishing the biological fact
of paternity. On the other hand, identifying children as legitimate or illegitimate
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honoring the contract by recognizing only the biological father's paternity
would confer upon the child illegitimate status, which is incompatible
with the long history of public policy decisions avoiding the bastardi-
zation of children. Illegitimacy alone no longer precludes the child from
inheriting. However, even with more accepting attitudes toward single
parenthood, a child characterized as illegitimate still grows up carrying
significant psychological burdens. The very word "bastard" is laden
with negative connotations implying guilt on the part of the illegitimate
rather than on the part of those who made him so.
If both fathers have recognized rights, it must be determined what
type of rights each has and whose rights will prevail in a dispute regarding
the child. While it has been determined that a "parent" has a paramount
right to custody of his child when challenged by a nonparent, 25 4 a
biological parent's rights will not necessarily prevail in a dispute with
the child's legal parent.25-
Surrogacy contracts are therefore particularly problematic regarding
the paternity of the child. Honoring the agreement, particularly where
the surrogate's husband did not consent, would bastardize the child. If
the contract is unenforceable, or the legal presumption of paternity is
applied for any reason, the child may be in the position of having dual
paternity. Case law indicates that current prevailing law would probably
award custody to the legal father-and hence to the surrogate-with
the possibility of visitation by the biological father. 25 6 The ultimate
determination of custody would be based on the child's best interest,
but the rights of the legal parents have been recognized as paramount
and would be protected absent a showing of conduct sufficiently egre-
gious to merit forfeiture. 257
B. Adoption and Consent
As in most jurisdictions, conflicts arise between the consent pro-
visions of Louisiana's adoption statutes and the terms of the typical
surrogate motherhood contract. The contract will call for irrevocable
consent, given prior to the birth of the child. 258 However, under Louisiana
is a classificatory process based primarily on legal rules rather than on biological
fact . .. [Iun the absence of a compelling argument to the contrary, we hold
that allowing the father . . . to establish his child's true filiation does not
bastardize the child, who remains the legitimate child of her [presumed] father.
Id. at 293.
254. Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
255. In re Murray, 445 So. 2d 21, 24 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
256. Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
257. Id. at 297.
258. Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 611 (1978); see also N. Keane
& D. Breo, supra note 13.
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law, voluntary surrender of a child for private adoption may not be
executed prior to five days following the birth of the child .2 9 In addition,
the surrendering parent or parents may issue a revocation of their consent
within thirty days after the act of surrender. 26°
The revocation does not, however, necessarily prevent the issuance
of an interlocutory or final decree of adoption, if the court deems it
in the child's best interests to proceed with the adoption. Such revocation
will trigger a contradictory hearing to determine whether it is in the
child's best interests to be returned to the surrendering parent or to
permit the adoption to proceed. 26'
Even in the case of voluntary surrender to an agency for adoption,
though the consent is irrevocable, the law provides that the surrender
may only be of a child who "was born in wedlock or out of wedlock". 262
Thus it would seem that to allow the enforcement of the consent
provisions of a typical surrogacy contract, which called for the surrender
of a child not yet born, an exception must be made to the existing
adoption law.
In addition, the statutes provide for an affidavit of fees and charges
in connection with the adoption. The form of this affidavit provides
for payment of certain specified charges, including medical expenses,
attorney's fees, agency fees263 and "other," with certification that no
other fees or charges than those disclosed have been or will be paid.2M
Although on its face this provision may seem sufficiently liberal to
accommodate surrogacy fees, the court may approve or disapprove the
fees. 265 Additionally, the same statute provides that the fee information
may be released by the court for the purposes of a criminal investigation
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:286, the statute prohibiting
the sale of children. 266
C. Sale of Minor Children
It is a criminal offense in Louisiana to give or receive anything of
value in exchange for the transfer of a minor child. 267 The offense is
a misdemeanor, and violators may be fined an amount not exceeding
one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than six months, or
259. La. R.S. 9:422, 427 (Supp. 1988).
260. La. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1988).
261. La. R.S. 9:429 (Supp. 1988).
262. La. R.S. 9:402 (Supp. 1988).
263. - The "Agency" must be one approved and licensed by the Louisiana DHHR. La.
R.S. 9:401(1) (Supp. 1988).
264. La. R.S. 9:424.1 (Supp. 1988).
265. Id.
266. La. R.S. 9:424.1(F) (Supp. 1988).
267. La. R.S. 14:286 (Supp. 1988).
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both. 26 The statute makes an exception for the reasonable medical,
living and legal expenses provided for in the adoption provision discussed
above. In addition, the statute explicitly allows payment of these per-
mitted expenses for a child not yet born.2 9
Clearly, Louisiana has chosen not to permit the exchange of a child
for money. The Attorney General has also clearly stated that he considers
the payment of a surrogate fee, above and beyond the actual living and
medical expenses associated with the birth, to be a violation of this
criminal provision. 270 He has further stated that the provisions of the
criminal statute are violated where the intermediary is paid a fee if it
is not an agency licensed by the State. 271
D. The Marital Relationship
The marriage contract2 72 in Louisiana creates mutual obligations
between the spouses of fidelity, support, and assistance. 2"1 The obligation
of fidelity is both a negative one-to refrain from adultery-and a
positive one-to submit to each other's "reasonable and normal sexual
desires. '274 It has been held that this positive obligation is a necessary
ingredient of the marriage, deprivation of which may amount to grounds
for separation from bed and board because of mental cruelty.2 75
A surrogate binds herself under the terms of her contract to abstain
from sexual relations with her husband, if she is married, during the
period of time prior to successful conception. 276 Her husband may well
not be a party to the contract, in order to avoid the issues of paternity
implicated by his consent to her artificial insemination. 277 As discussed
earlier in this article, the issue then becomes whether the surrogate may
legally so bind herself in the first instance, and if she can, is her husband
bound by a contract to which he is not a party? May he enforce his
marital rights?
E. Social Policy and Ethics
None of the problems outlined above are unresolvable. To the
contrary-unlike many of the contractual issues involved, most of the
268. Id.
269. La. R.S. 14:286(B) (Supp. 1988).
270. Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 83-869 (Oct. 18, 1983).
271. Id.
272. See La. Civ. Code art. 86.
273. La. Civ. Code art. 98.
274. Id. comment (b).
275. Id. See also La. Civ. Code art. 138(3).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98 & 128.
277. La. Civ. Code art. 188. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59 & 95.
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conflicts between surrogacy contracts and the current scheme of Louis-
iana law could be remedied through legislation regulating such contracts
and providing specific exceptions to the application of the above pro-
visions. The moment of truth comes in deciding what we are trying to
protect. The existing law represents a product of practical considerations
and basic policy choices. Most of the structure serves some purpose. If
that purpose is incompatible with surrogate motherhood contracts, a
choice has to be made concerning which interests are more weighty.
One of the most compelling of state interests is the protection of.
its children, and one of our law's most basic assumptions is that children
belong with their biological parents whenever feasible. 278 Adoption is an
extraordinary remedy fashioned to provide an acceptable alternative when
a child's biological parent or parents are unwilling, unfit, or unable to
care for him. This characterization of adoption is not intended to cast
it in an unduly negative light. It has been recognized, though, that
adoptees are prone to particular problems related to their adopted status
such as feelings of rejection and longing to know their biological identity. 279
For this reason, among others, state adoption procedures are designed
to protect the welfare of the child, to allow a biological parent reasonable
opportunity to revoke a surrender, and to not remove a child from his
biological family unless strict statutory indicia are present. 2 0 These pro-
cedures also protect the interests of the parent or parents. A surrogate
motherhood contract bypasses some significant safeguards built into the
adoption system to protect both children and parents. Surrogacy is far
less focused on the needs of the child than is adoption. It is, rather,
"primarily to satiate the psychic and financial needs of adult parties. '"281
Given the best-case scenario, that all parties to the contract are
satisfied with their roles and perform their contractual obligations, the
child's interests are still not considered. Not only must he cope with
the potential bereavement of adoption, 282 but also with the added re-
alization that he was given up in exchange for compensation. As one
commentator has phrased it, "[i]f the traditional family norm can be
considered ideal (a presumption upon which many laws are based), then
adoption is making the best out of a bad situation. Conversely, surrogacy
creates, through extraordinary means, the bad situation. ' 28 3
278. Katz, supra note 16, at 11 n.44 (citing the Child Welfare League of America's
Standards for Adoption Service).
279. Id. at 11-12; O'Brien, supra note 23, at 144 & n.152.
280. See La. R.S. 9:403-22.1 (Supp. 1988).
281. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 145.
282. Katz, supra note 16, at 11 n.46; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23,
at 425 & n.83.
283. Balhoff, Surrogate Motherhood and In Vitro Fertilization: The Case for Prohi-
bition 7 (1987) (unpublished manuscript). The Baby M. court recognized the special
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This position has been countered with the argument that to oppose
surrogacy on these grounds is tantamount to a conclusion that the child
would be better off never having been born. A ban on surrogacy would
therefore have the undesirable effect of preventing these potential chil-
dren's births. 284 Professor Robertson states that "[e]ven if there is a
higher degree of confusion, unhappiness, or maladjustment in donor-
assisted reproduction, a child would seem better off under this collab-
orative structure than not to exist at all.' '28 This argument is putting
the cart before the horse.
A person before conception is a nonentity. He can have no
interests except in the prospective sense. But such prospective
interests are entirely dependent upon the inevitability of his
existence .... Prohibition of reproductive means cuts off the
prospects of existence, and thus the prospective interests. The
contrary argument leads to folly. If we endow each sperm and
each egg with the right to unite and become a person, the results
would be interesting indeed. 28 6
As one commentator has noted, such logic would lead inevitably to the
conclusion that society would have difficulty justifying any method of
birth control.28 7
Given the worst-case scenario, that there is a serious breach involving
custody of the child, there are no winners. If the contract is enforced,
a child is being removed from its biological mother without a showing
of the statutory indicia normally required. She may be perfectly willing,
fit and able to mother the child. On the other hand, if the biological
father is denied custody, his parental rights are compromised. The child
either loses one of his biological parents, or becomes the subject of a
protracted custody battle.
It is also possible that involuntarily childless couples (or individuals)
who do not have all the technological options available to them to
produce a child of their own will turn to adoption of "special needs"
children. There is enormous need for placement of these children, 288 and
it has been observed that as the availability of "perfect" newborns has
decreased and public awareness of these special children and the potential
rewards of parenting them has increased, their placement has increased.28 9
counseling the child would need in order to deal with the facts of her origin. In re Baby
M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 398, 525 A.2d 1128, 1170 (Ch. Div. 1987).
284. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 23, at 434.
285. Robertson, New Reproduction, supra note 195, at 1000.
286. Balhoff, supra note 283, at 8.
287. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 145.




While this type of adoption is certainly not for everyone, increasing its
attractiveness as an option is a worthwhile social goal.
So basic is the notion of at least limited revocability of consent
that courts have, even while upholding the validity of surrogacy contracts,
held that consent provisions make those contracts voidable. 29° Proposed
legislation includes provisions for revocability of the surrogate's con-
sent, 291 despite the contractual uncertainty it creates for the parties. The
requirement in the adoption statutes that consent may not be binding
until five days post-partum-as well as the prohibition of compensation
therefore-do not simply protect mothers who may be coerced fairly
late in an undesired pregnancy. A mother could decide very early in
pregnancy, without influence, to give up her child and could still not
be bound by any consent given before five days after birth. Obviously
there was a legislative policy choice made against permitting binding
consent until pregnancy and childbirth were completed. There is no
compelling or even convincing policy reason why surrogate motherhood
should not be subjected to the same constraints.
The adoption and criminal provisions work together to prohibit the
payment of consideration for the transfer of a child. Traditionally,
babyselling laws have prohibited payment in connection with an adoption
and are designed to prevent the coercion of an unwed mother in giving
up her parental rights. 292 Proponents of surrogacy argue that the black
market adoption rationale does not hold in the surrogacy context, because
the mother decides, without coercion, to bring the child into being for
the express purpose of giving it up. 293 The courts have been divided on
the issue of applicability of these statutes to surrogacy contracts. 294 Those
courts finding that the statutes are applicable and voiding payment of
the surrogate or the contract in toto have done so on the basis of
policy, finding that the policies behind babyselling apply to surrogacy. 295
Those courts finding the statutes inapplicable have usually done so on
the basis of statutory interpretation and legislative history. 296
290. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 213 (Ky. 1986); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972 505 N.Y.S.2d
813, 817 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
291. Note, supra note 6, at 898 (discussing proposals in Michigan, Kansas, Connecticut,
Hawaii, and Minnesota).
292. See generally, Katz, supra note 16, at 13.
293. Id. at 19; Special Project, supra note 30, at 641; Note, supra note 6, at 886-87.
294. See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); In re Baby M.,
109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1127 (1988). Cf. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d
1128 (Ch. Div. 1987); Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Arms-
trong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
295. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1127 (1988).
296. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209
(Ky. 1986); Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438.
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Babyselling laws are premised upon two basic policies: first, that
the economic inducement of a mother to part with her child is uncon-
scionable, and second, that a child should not be treated as chattel. 297
Those proponents of surrogacy who maintain that no economic in-
ducement to part with a child takes place are simply not convincing.
A reading of the trial court opinion in In re Baby M. gives an accurate
portrayal of the disparity of the economic interests represented in a
typical surrogacy contract. The Sterns were quite comfortably, well-to-
do professionals. The Whiteheads had a long history of severe economic
troubles and, in fact, both of their mortgages were in foreclosure at
the time the contract was signed. 29 The pressures of their existence were
palpable in the opinion.
Neither may the second policy consideration be passed over lightly.
In Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky placed a great deal of emphasis upon
the fact that the surrogacy agreement, unlike a baby-broker's agreement,
is entered into before conception, rather than at a time when the mother
is pregnant and possibly under economic duress. 29 The Kentucky At-
torney General noted in his opinion the "long-standing legal principle
and public policy that children are not chattel and therefore may not
be the subject of a contract or gift."' ' 0 Given a basic social policy
prohibiting treating persons as property, it would seem that to make a
person's very creation the subject of contract should likewise be pro-
hibited. Such a practice is an even more egregious violation of this
principle than merely paying for the right to adopt him.3 1'
There will be unwed mothers who would desire to relinquish custody
of their babies with or without payment. If payment of surrogates is
allowed, why shouldn't payment of noncoerced pregnant mothers be
allowed as well? The answer is simply that the free consent of particular
individuals is not determinative in this context. The very process is
exploitative of human beings, and for that reason is against public
policy.
Many women, and men as well, fear that the practice of surrogacy
will reverse the social gains women have made since the advent of
297. Katz, supra note 16, at 17. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gill v. Lapidus, 202 Misc.
1116, 1118, 120 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ("A child is not a chattel to be
bought or sold, directly or indirectly".).
298. 217 N.J. Super. at 340, 525 A.2d at 1140.
299. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12.
300. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 150 (1982).
301. It has been suggested that in the case of embryo transfer (where the surrogate
provides only gestational services for the egg of the wife fertilized by the husband) the
justifications for unenforceability of the contract do not exist, because the child "belongs"
to the contracting couple. Note, supra note 196, at 239-40. While at first blush this seems
innately fair, it raises troubling specters of the child as property and concepts of ownership.
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contraceptives. Proponents like John Robertson argue that the separation
of reproduction into component roles is freeing for women. 30 2 This
reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it overlooks the fact that for
every woman who is "freed" another will be "trapped" into a role of
reproducing for pay. This does not necessarily promote a responsible
approach to alternative means of reproduction, as is seen in suggestions
that women will benefit by using surrogacy for convenience as well as
necessity. 30 3
In addition, the dehumanization that inevitably results from the
breakdown of traditional reproductive roles is hardly freeing for anyone.
Robertson has said that "[i]f married persons have the right to have
and raise children, it should follow that they have the right to enlist
the support of physicians and others to obtain reproductive factors
(sperm, eggs or uterus) that will enable them to do so.''3° This reduction
of human reproduction, especially the intimacy and wonder of the
carrying of a child, to the status of "factors" is offensive to many and
frightening to some. It should at least encourage some thought regarding
the ultimate destination at which we may arrive when we embark upon
such a path.
While it is true that most change, even beneficial change, is met
with some resistance, it must also be conceded that there is some validity
to the idea of a "slippery slope."3 5 Robertson points out that tech-
nological change should not be denied in our time because of perceived
fears of the nature of future society, as "societies with such visionary
techniques available may well have undergone social and normative
changes that make such uses perfectly acceptable to them.''36 Perhaps
such "social and normative change" is simply the reality of a slippery
slope. We have an obligation to be responsive to the changing needs
and capabilities of society. But we have a concomitant obligation to
use our changing abilities wisely, including limiting them, because of
our investment in that society of the future. 30
The social policies implicated by the conflicts between surrogacy
contracts on the one hand and marital obligations and paternity on the
other represent disruptions to the legal structure we have chosen. These
disruptions are necessary if the law is to accommodate surrogate moth-
302. Robertson, New Reproduction, supra note 195, at 1026, 1029-32.
303. Id. at 1012 & n.244.
304. Billig, supra note 196, at 57 (quoting Prof. Robertson's testimony before the
House Committee on Science & Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Aug. 8, 1984) (emphasis added).
305. See Robertson, New Reproduction, supra note 195, at 1025.
306. Id. at 1026 n.300.
307. See generally Cahill, In Vitro Fertilization: Ethical Issues in Judaeo-Christian
Perspective, 32 Loy L. Rev. 337 (1986).
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erhood contracts. Before deviating so markedly from policy decisions
already made, it must be recognized that to do so will call into question
definitions of roles and relationships very basic to our social order.
Such steps should be taken advisedly and slowly.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The issues implicated by surrogacy contracts are many and diverse.
Some could be adequately resolved through careful legislation, while
others-particularly contractual considerations-are less easily managed.
The most difficult issues to deal with objectively are those involving
ethics, notions of morality and societal good, and policy choices that
have been made collectively by the people over time, choices that have
come to define our social and legal structure.
The legislature has been called to the front lines of a very heated
debate, and charged with the responsibility of resolving the matter for
the benefit of all the people. There are three courses of action open to
it:
1. Maintain the status quo, keeping surrogate contracts legal
but unenforceable.
2. Make surrogacy contracts legal and enforceable, with the
concomitant necessity of reasonable regulation.
3. Make surrogate motherhood contracts illegal and unenforce-
able.
The recommendation of this article is that these contracts be made
unlawful as well as unenforceable. The status quo is entirely unaccept-
able, since parties have insufficient disincentives against entering into
an unenforceable contract the object of which is the creation of a child.
These contracts are against the public policy and best interests of the
people of this state. For the protection of all concerned, there needs
to be disincentives sufficient to prevent formation of unenforceable
surrogacy contracts. This can best be achieved by following the English
example: making commercial surrogacy a criminal offense, but reserving
sanctions against only the intermediaries and others who solicit and
prepare the contract. No compelling purpose would be served by sub-
jecting the parties in the most damaged position in the case of a disputed
surrogacy contract, the parents, to criminal sanctions. In addition, equity
would demand that those who profit most bear a proportionate risk.
In the event of a disputed contract where the custody of the child
is at issue, both biological parents should be accorded the same rights
and privileges under the law as they would enjoy in any custody dispute.
Thus, the existence of the contract should not operate against either
party, and the matter should be resolved "in the best interests of the
child." Courts should be statutorily constrained to consider only those
issues and types of evidence normally considered in a custody proceeding.
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"They should not use the unique circumstances of the child's birth as
a weapon against either parent.''30
Of course, the bottom line in this analysis is that there are childless
couples who will be deprived of one possible means of obtaining a baby
who could satisfy their dreams and aspirations. There are also willing
surrogates who would fulfill their contractual obligations without pause.
Where, then, is the great harm in allowing the practice, if the greater
number will never be litigated? The harm is in the damage to our
perception of humanity, as well as the incalculable harm to those parties
who do suffer a breach.
It is because "[tIhere are, in a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy.'' 3 9
Barbara L. Keller
308. Graham, supra note 190, at 319.
309. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1127 (1988).
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